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Courts,1 legislators,2 agencies,' and employees of the securities
industry4 are calling into question the present system requiring individuals
to prospectively waive their right to a judicial forum and arbitrate their
individual employment disputes in the forums specified by the securities
industry.5 Even employers are conceding that the present system may not
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1. See, e.g., Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir.
1997) (concluding that employees' statutory rights are not all completely or automatically
waived by signing an arbitration agreement); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465,
1467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between arbitration agreements, and noting that
the court will enforce only those "that do not undermine the relevant statutory scheme");
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass.
1997), affd on other grounds, 163 F.3d 53 (Ist Cir. 1998).
2. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S. Res. 63, 105th Cong. (1997)
(enacted) (attempting to amend some civil rights statutes to prevent the involuntary
application of arbitration); H.R. 983, 105th Cong. (1997) (similar bill); see also S. 121,
106th Cong. (1999).
3. See EEOC, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (visited Jan. 25, 1999)
<http:/www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.txt> [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement];
Enforcement Guidance on Non-Waivable Employee Rights Under EEOC Enforced Statutes
1 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), at N:2329 (Apr. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Enforcement
Guidance]. See generally Darryl Van Duch, Assault on Mandatory Arbitration, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 25, 1997, at B1.
4. See generally Steve Bailey & Steven Syre, The Showdown over Mandatory
Arbitration, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 1997, at Dl; Peter Truell, Smith Barney Plaintiffs
Agree to Incentives for Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at D1 (reporting that
plaintiffs balked at binding arbitration).
5. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION,
How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 1, 3 (1994)
20 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:1
work as originally intended. This situation poses an intriguing question:
Why are these various constituencies tentative in their support of
arbitration, while even the securities industry has enthusiastically supported
it?
This Article explores the alternate dispute resolution ("ADR")
mechanism of binding arbitration as it is invoked to resolve employment
disputes in the securities industry. Newly hired securities employees must
sign a U-4 form, a registration and disclosure document for all of the
exchanges. Signing a U-4 agreement "is a condition of employment...
[requiring] signatories to arbitrate disputes that may arise with their
firms."6  The pre-dispute arbitration agreement ("PDAA") clause is
triggered typically when a broker or other securities professional is fired.
The dismissed employee brings suit in court believing that the employer
has violated the employee's civil rights in employment. 7 Citing the U-4
PDAA, the employer motions the court to stay proceedings because the
employee had signed an arbitration agreement. The catch is that employees
sign the U-4 not so much to agree prospectively to binding arbitration as to
have the requisite registration, and most importantly, so that they can have
a job. For this, employees agree, usually, to have their disputes resolved in
a system run by the securities industry with no effective agency oversight s
and little in the way of meaningful judicial review.9
[hereinafter GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT] (noting long-standing practice of arbitrating
disputes).
6. Id. at 4.
7. The charges discussed in this Article relate to Title VII, Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), and Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") claims. State statutes
and claims based upon various common law claims, such as the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, may also be brought. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (outlawing
workplace age discrimination); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (guaranteeing all persons the same
and equal rights under the law); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (outlawing workplace
discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or pregnancy); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (1994) (outlawing discrimination against handicapped individuals who are
otherwise qualified for the job). For an example of a state civil rights statute, see the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998)
(opposing discrimination because of "race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex,
affectional or sexual orientation, marital status, [or familial status]").
8. See GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the lack of review,
oversight, or inspection by the Securities and Exchange Commission of members' securities
arbitration programs); see also Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with
Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. Louis U.
PuB. L. REv. 203, 219-20 (1992) (examining the EEOC's oversight of antidiscrimination
laws and concluding that it has not effectively enforced them).
9. See Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the extremely limited circumstances in which an arbitration award might be
vacated, such as when it "fl[ies] in the face of clearly established legal precedent"); see also
Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive
Dispute Resolutions?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 134 (1996) (noting that under
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This Article addresses the important policy questions whereby many
employees have alleged that they must sign away their Fifth Amendment
right to due process, Article IlI right to an independent judge, and Seventh
Amendment right to a representative jury,'° in favor of a forum sponsored
and run by none other than their employers. While the vast majority of
courts in the last eleven years have upheld PDAAs, most recently, there has
been a demonstrable erosion of support for this system. This in turn has
created a high degree of uncertainty in the securities industry regarding the
enforceability of PDAAs. This Article discusses the most important cases
in this area and in what respects the law remains unsettled.
The reasons for these recent changes, as well as what has gone wrong
with mandatory employment arbitration in the securities industry, are
discussed below. Strategies to stabilize the process for resolving these
employment disputes are also recommended.
The history of arbitration is briefly outlined in Part I, followed by a
background of the major arbitration cases. Part II presents the arbitration of
employment disputes in the securities industry and a summary of recent
regulatory proposals and cases. Part I1 discusses the reasons for the
changes to the system and proposals that have been made for the future.11
I. HISTORY OF ARBITRATION
Part I, which describes arbitration and details how it has evolved, is
composed of three sections. Section A provides a general background of
arbitration. Section B traces the history of arbitration, beginning with the
this "highly deferential standard of judicial review," arbitrators may have little incentive to
engage in rigorous analysis and decision making).
10. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (guaranteeing that no one will be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law); see also U.S. CONST. art. III (providing
federal judges with life tenure and salary protection to safeguard the independence of the
judiciary); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (guaranteeing trials in civil cases). See generally
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190, 192-94, 202
(D. Mass. 1997), affd on other grounds, 163 F.3d 53 (Ist Cir. 1998).
11. This Article discusses arbitrations of individual employment disputes, rather than
those covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Part II contains the main focal point of
discussion of this Article, the arbitration of individual employment disputes in the securities
industry. The present section serves to detail the law leading up to the present cases
discussed herein. Courts have addressed issues relating to the arbitration of disputes
covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). See, e.g., Wright v. Universal
Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997);
Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 294 (1997);
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996); Tran v.
Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996); Spymal v. Prudential
Ins. Co., No. 96 C 8544, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12607 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1997); La Chance
v. Northeast Publ'g Inc., 965 F. Supp. 177 (D. Mass. 1997).
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passage of the Federal Arbitration Act. Section C introduces more
specifically cases involving arbitration in the securities industry. Finally,
Section D discusses arbitration of employment disputes.
A. General Background of Arbitration
To better understand the issues raised in this Article, it is necessary to
know what arbitration is and what it is not. Arbitration may be defined as
the process of submitting a disagreement to one or more impartial persons
with the understanding that the two parties are bound by the decision.
12
Arbitration is but one ADR technique 13 developed in response to the
expense, delays, perceived shortcomings of juries, and the oftentimes
negative public aspect of traditional litigation. 14 Arbitration has become
favored over litigation, due mainly to speed, cost, and privacy. Disputes
are generally resolved faster in arbitration, resulting in drastically lower
costs, and the results are not as publicly accessible as in litigation where
court documents are, for the most part, in the public record.
Once arbitration has been chosen, any subsequent disputes that the
parties may have must be submitted to arbitration. Should one party try to
circumvent this arrangement by seeking relief in court, the court is bound
to stay litigation until the dispute is decided in arbitration. After this time,
should a party wish, judicial review is possible but cursory. Furthermore,
changes in the decision will be made only under limited circumstances,
such as if there has been a manifest disregard of the law.15 Parties usually
hire counsel to represent them, and arbitrators may be selected and paid for
by one or both parties. Discovery in these proceedings is limited. The
final decisions and their reasoning may or may not be written.
Arbitration may take place only when the parties agree to it and only
12. See Margo E. K. Reder, Securities Law and Arbitration: The Enforceability of
Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Customer Agreements, 1990 COLuM. Bus. L.
REv. 91, 93 & n.10.
13. Other ADR techniques include mediation, neutral evaluation, nonbinding
arbitration, mini-trials, and summary jury trials. See EDWARD J. BRuNET, ALTERNATVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE (1997).
14. See generally Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Requirements a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory
Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 993 (1996) (citing how
employers are embracing ADR in an effort to avoid "the tremendous time and expense
involved in litigating"); Hoffman, supra note 9, at 132 (discussing how ADR is a welcomed
vehicle to reduce the costs, length, and backlog of litigation); Eugene Rosner, Mediating
Commercial and Probate Disputes, N.J. LAW., Sept. 8, 1997, at 33 (noting clients
increasingly demanding ADR as a way of avoiding "expense and the unconscionable
delays ... [of] traditional litigation").
15. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 935 (1985); Cole v.
Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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for those disputes contemplated in the agreement. Any matters outside the
scope of the arbitration agreement are litigated. Parties may agree to
arbitrate before or after a dispute arises.
The arbitration agreement may be the product of the parties' efforts.
The troubling and contentious issue is whether the agreement was a
bargained-for exchange, or whether it was given to employees on a "take-
it-or-leave-it" basis, and not a product of the parties' efforts. The interest
in arbitration and its consequent application began slowly but has gained
momentum as lawsuits and legal costs have increased. 16 Arbitration and
other ADR techniques are an attempt, especially by repeat players in
disputes, to better manage dispute resolution costs. 17 Arbitration, and ADR
in general, are wonderfully effective in most cases. ADR must be
supported as it has a vital role in dispute resolution. Arbitration, however,
must be done with great care, in an inclusive, knowing, and voluntary
manner in which all stakeholders are considered. In the cases that follow,
the demand for arbitration was almost entirely management-driven, and
little effort was made to ensure that employees' rights were protected.
B. The Onset of Arbitration
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925 in order
to encourage the use of arbitration as a means of resolving commercial
disputes." The Act was intended to reverse hostility to arbitration "at this
time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of
litigation."' 9 The FAA places arbitration agreements on the same footing
as other contracts, and Congress intended the FAA to be generously
construed, notwithstanding any contrary state law of arbitration.20 Courts
are, therefore, bound to uphold parties' agreements and will stay litigation
pending resolution by arbitration.
16. See Stan Bullard, Ex-Judges Promoting Alternative to Law-suits, CRAIN'S CLEv.
Bus., Dec. 21, 1998, at 1; Thomas Scheffey, Peacemakers at Law, CONN. L. TRm., Dec. 21,
1998.
17. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative)
Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REv. 591, 592, 619 (stating that employers'
repeat experience with arbitration provides significant advantages).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924).
19. Id. at 2.
20. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1983). While there are
exceptions to the arbitration mandate of the FAA, these are construed most narrowly. See 9
U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). See generally R. James Filiault, Comment, Enforcing
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts: A Common Sense Approach to
the Federal Arbitration Act's Section 1 Exclusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 559, 571-86
(1996) (discussing majority view narrowly construing the exclusions to arbitration).
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The Supreme Court has frequently considered arbitration cases, and
while it did not support the FAA in earlier cases,2' the Court most recently
22has consistently upheld pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, recognizing
the supremacy of the federal substantive law of arbitrability.23 This has
been the case even when disputes have involved arbitration of claims based
on state law,24 Sherman Act antitrust violations,2' the Securities Act,26 the
Securities and Exchange Act,
27 civil racketeering under RICO,
28
international business29 and even age discrimination under the ADEA. °
The Court has thus enforced arbitration agreements involving complex
issues and statutory claims, even when the statutes provide for jury trials.
The Court's rationale, best expressed in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., is that it is merely enforcing the parties'
agreement and that neither party will "forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute.
' 31
There are limits, though, to the Court's support of arbitration. For
example, the Court will hold the parties to their bargain--"unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies. 32
The Court has also cautioned that "the FAA does not confer a right to
compel arbitration of any dispute at any time, but rather it confers the right
to seek an order compelling arbitration 'in the manner provided for in [the
parties'] agreement.'
' 33
Thus, arbitration has evolved from a disfavored dispute resolution
technique into a preferred method through this line of Supreme Court
cases. The Court has strongly endorsed arbitration as an alternative to
litigation, so much so that it is currently a standard practice in many fields,
most notably in the securities industry, which has used arbitration for over
21. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (refusing to compel arbitration of
Securities Act claims).
22. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
23. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984).
24. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-24 (1985) (per curiam);
cf. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
25. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640
(1985).
26. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-86
(1989).
27. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
28. See id. at 238-42.
29. See Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
30. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,24,35 (1991).
31. 473 U.S. at 628.
32. Id.
33. Margo E. K. Reder, Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Remedy in Broker-
Customer Securities Arbitration Cases, 29 IND. L. REV. 105, 109 (1995) [hereinafter Reder,
Punitive Damages].
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one hundred years as a method of resolving disputes.
34
C. Arbitration of Disputes in the Securities Industry-The Supreme
Court's View
Disputes within the securities industry arise most often in two
contexts. The first involves financial disputes that occur between brokers
and customers regarding the management of customers' accounts. More
often than not, these disputes are triggered by market downturns or general
portfolio losses due to mismanagement. The second context encompasses
employment disputes that arise between firms and their employees which
may have to be resolved by arbitration. For example, the firm may fire a
broker for failing to achieve a desired level of production or sales.
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Wilko v. Swan,35 which involved
a "novel federal question affecting both the Securities Act and the United
States Arbitration Act. '36 Finding that the complexity of securities issues
necessitated litigation rather than arbitration, the Court concluded that the
Securities Act trumped the Arbitration Act.37 The next challenge to
arbitration in the securities industry occurred many years later, and by then,
the perception of arbitration had improved dramatically.3 ' As in Wilko, the
claim in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon3 9 arose from a
broker-customer dispute, but the plaintiffs in this case brought suit under
the Exchange Act, ostensibly hoping for a different result from Wilko. In a
five-to-four opinion in favor of arbitration, the Supreme Court outlined the
background of arbitration, especially noting its Mitsubishi40 decision. It
upheld the validity of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even when the
claims involved complex federal securities issues, reasoning that it would
do so unless there was a clear contrary directive from Congress.
41
Two years later, the court took an opportunity to reconsider Wilko, and
overruled that opinion in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman
Brothers, Inc.42 Again in a five-to-four opinion by a transitional Court, the
Court achieved a "uniform interpretation of similar statutory language"
between the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts.
43
34. See GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
35. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
36. Id. at430.
37. See id. at 434-45.
38. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (discussing a line of arbitration
cases).
39. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
40. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
41. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
42. 490 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1989).
43. Id.
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Following these major benchmarks in the law of securities arbitration,
there have been few other securities arbitration disputes to reach the
Supreme Court. The Court in Perry v. Thomas" considered a statutory
wage claim by a former securities employee. Finding that the employee
had signed a PDAA, the Court concluded that he was bound to arbitrate
this claim.45 In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. ,46 the Court
considered whether state or federal law governs the arbitrability of claims
for punitive damages. The investors, who suffered heavy losses, had
signed a PDAA purportedly governed by New York law that prohibited
arbitral awards of punitive damages.47 Finding ambiguity in the parties'
agreement, the Court construed this in favor of the investors and allowed
relief in the form of punitive damages.4 8 The Supreme Court's opposition
to arbitration of financial securities disputes is long past, and the years
1987 through 1995 will be recognized as a period of unquestioning support
for arbitration.
D. Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes-The Supreme Court's
View
The arbitration of employment disputes is somewhat more
problematic, it seems, in comparison to the arbitration of financial disputes.
First, there has been a fair amount of litigation over whether employment
disputes are exempt from the FAA. In Section 1 of the FAA, it states that
"nothing herein.., shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce., 49 It would appear, then, that securities employees
are not bound by the FAA. This, however, is not the case. Federal courts
have held, and the Supreme Court implicitly agrees, that since the
arbitration clause securities employees sign is contained in a registration
application (the U-4 form) and is not part of an actual contract of
employment, they are not exempt from the FAA.
50
The seminal Supreme Court case considering the arbitration of an
44. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
45. See id.
46. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
47. See id.
48. See generally Reder, Punitive Damages, supra note 33.
49. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
50. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
that "every circuit to consider this issue squarely has found" this to be the case). See
generally Stokes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 523 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir.
1975); Malison v. Prudential-Bache See., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 101, 104 (W.D.N.C. 1987);
Tonetti v. Shirley, 219 Cal. Rptr. 616 (Ct. App. 1985); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987).
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employment dispute in the securities industry is Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.51 Relying on the Mitsubishi/McMahon/
Rodriquez de Quijas trilogy, the Court held that a securities dealer's age
discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration under New
York Stock Exchange "NYSE" rules, as per the registration application that
Gilmer signed. 2 The Court reasoned that arbitration agreements should be
vigorously enforced even for statutory claims, absent a contrary directive
from Congress. The standard that Gilmer set, then, is for courts to ask
whether the relevant statutory scheme is undermined. The Gilmer Court
quoted the Mitsubishi Court in support of arbitration, stating that: "So long
as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both
its remedial and deterrent function. 53 Courts have been uneven in their
application of this analysis to the recent cases discussed in Section B infra.
As with the Rodriguez de Quijas/Wilko contrast in outcomes, Gilmer
stands in contrast with a line of employment arbitration cases beginning
with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.5 4 While this line of cases addresses
Title VII claims of union employees bound by collective bargaining
agreements ("CBAs") in contrast to Title VII claims of individual
employees, many of the principles are applicable to both classes of
employees. In Gardner-Denver, the Court held that a discharged employee
whose grievance was arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration clause in a CBA
could also bring a Title VII claim in court.55 The Court reasoned that a
labor arbitrator had authority to resolve only questions of contractual
rights; Title VII allegations, while arising out of the same factual
occurrence, were distinctly of a separate nature from those that were
arbitrated. 6 The Court found that independent statutory rights are not
waived by a union's agreement because such rights are not susceptible to
waiver.57
In mandating arbitration of age discrimination claims, the Gilmer
Court took care not to overrule Gardner-Denver, but instead distinguished
it, asserting that the statutory rights under the ADEA may be waived as the
51. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.: Its Ramifications and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (1998); Lucille M. Ponte, In the Shadow of Gilmer: How Post-
Arbitration Agreements Point the Way Towards Greater Fairness in Employment
Arbitration, 12 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 359 (1997).
52. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
53. Id. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
54. 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
55. See 415 U.S. at 49-50.
56. See id. at 49-50, 53-54.
57. See id.
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subject of an arbitration agreement.58 Gardner-Denver is a case that has
continuing vitality, and has been very recently cited as support for the view
that Title VII claims should not be automatically sent to arbitration. 9 In
Wright v. Universal Maritime Corp.,6° Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, recognized the tension "between these two lines of
cases." 61 The Court reconciled the case law and stated that "Gardner-
Denver at least stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial
forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit
union waiver in a CBA.' '62 The Court, then, will determine whether the
CBA contains a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of the right to a judicial
forum before it will deny that right.63 This line of cases, allowing access to
a judicial forum notwithstanding an arbitration agreement, occurs in the
context of union-negotiated agreements. It is interesting to note that
individual employees have virtually no negotiating power or bargaining
representation, yet under Gilmer they are bound to their agreements more
so than their union counterparts. Nevertheless, Gilmer stands for the
proposition that where the employee signed an agreement to submit any
employment dispute to binding arbitration, and subsequently brought an
age discrimination claim, the Court will enforce this agreement to arbitrate.
II. ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES IN THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY
It becomes clear, then, that arbitration is a relatively new dispute
resolution technique, gaining widespread favor only in the past fifteen
years. It is particularly desirable to management due to its speed, low cost,
and privacy. The Supreme Court first recognized arbitration for
employment disputes in 1991 when it compelled arbitration of an age
discrimination claim. The Gilmer decision has led other courts to embrace
and expand the use of employment arbitration for an even wider range of
employment discrimination claims, including Title VII actions.64  The
58. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
59. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 995 F. Supp. 190, 194-
211 (D. Mass. 1997), affd on other grounds, 163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998); LaChance v.
Northeast Publ'g, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 177 (D. Mass. 1997). Although these opinions are both
by Judge Gertner, these are by no means aberrations from the most current decisions passing
on the arbitration of civil rights claims. See infra Section B.




64. See, e.g., Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997)
(compelling arbitration of sexual harassment charge brought under state law); Keuhner v.
Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 1996) (compelling arbitration of wrongful discharge
claim); Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995) (compelling arbitration
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apparent rationale for the courts' expansive readings of Gilmer are that the
other antidiscrimination statutes are similar to the ADEA in their aims and
substantive provisions.65 Whether this was the intent of Congress or the
Supreme Court remains to be seen.
This Part is composed of two sections. Section A discusses the legal
and regulatory changes since Gilmer that have relevance to whether Gilmer
has application beyond age discrimination claims. Section B discusses on a
circuit-by-circuit basis how courts are deciding whether individuals
prospectively relinquish their right to a judicial forum when they sign a
securities industry U-4 form.
A. Legal and Regulatory Changes Since Gilmer
Judge Gertner explained in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. that
Gilmer addressed only the arbitrability of ADEA, not Title VII,
claims. Gilmer did not raise and the Supreme Court did not
resolve whether Title VII's text, history, or purpose should bar
compulsory arbitration. Shortly after Gilmer was decided,
moreover, Congress amended Title VII in numerous ways that
66are potentially relevant to that analysis.
1. Legal Changes-The Civil Rights Act of 1991
"To restore and reinforce the civil rights of victims of employment
discrimination," 67 Congress passed a compromise measure which secured
more complete compensation for victims of discrimination and eased
plaintiffs' procedural hurdles and burdens of proof.6 Most notably for this
of race, sex, and national origin claims); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656
(5th Cir. 1995) (compelling arbitration of claims based on the Age Discrimination Act as
amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994) (compelling arbitration of pregnancy
discrimination claim).
65. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
66. 995 F. Supp. 190, 200 (D. Mass. 1998).
67. Id. The Act's purpose, to some degree, was to alter the impact of five Supreme
Court decisions from the 1988 Term which Congress perceived as negatively impacting
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See generally William M. Howard,
Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really
Vant To?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 255, 277-78 (1994); Pierre Levy, Note, Gilmer Revisited: The
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Article, though, the 1991 Act contains a section addressing ADR of Title
VII claims. Section 118, seen as a "polite bow to the popularity of
'alternative dispute resolution' and perhaps a mild sop to the judiciary,"
encourages parties to use ADR "[w]here appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law."69  Clearly, the critical language here is the word
"encourages." Both zealous advocates and critics of binding arbitration
have found grounds for their interpretation of congressional intent in this
language. However, a more congruous approach to the entire 1991
amendments and legislative history reveals that "Congress intended
arbitration and jury trials to co-exist."70 Cognizant of Gardner-Denver and
its progeny, as well as recent Supreme Court opinions, Congress molded a
middle ground. It refused to overrule Gardner-Denver and stated that its
encouragement of ADR was intended to supplement, not supplant, rights
and remedies found in litigation that would otherwise be available.71
It may be surmised, then, with respect to the Supreme Court and
congressional pronouncements to date, that binding arbitration for Title VII
disputes is not compulsory but merely optional-encouraged, but optional.
Through the enactment of the 1991 Act, Congress had the opportunity to
make binding arbitration mandatory, yet declined to do so. The Supreme
Court has not yet approved compulsory prospective binding arbitration of
individual employment disputes outside the realm of age discrimination
claims.
2. Regulatory Changes to Arbitration by the Securities Industry
Since McMahon was decided in 1987, the regulations governing
prospective agreements to arbitrate further developed and subsequently
evolved. The two agencies charged with supervising employment
arbitration in the securities industry are the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC,,).
72
The SEC's oversight responsibility for arbitration programs is
tenuous. Its management is largely derivative in that it regulates the self-
regulatory organizations ("SROs"). 73 To the extent that oversight exists,
Judicial Erosion of Employee Statutory Rights, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 455, 466-69 (1996).
69. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
294 (1997); see also Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991).
70. Levy, supra note 68, at 468; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 97 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 97; see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 201 (D. Mass. 1997), affd on other grounds, 163
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998).
72. See GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-5.
73. See id. at 4. SROs are organizations such as the NYSE and the National
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the SEC focuses its attention on financial disputes--"customer-firm
disputes because of its mandates for customer protection."74 It does not
monitor SRO arbitration of employment discrimination cases even though
employees' civil rights are at issue.75
Despite this situation, the SEC was an ardent supporter of compulsory
binding arbitration for employment disputes. In fact, in 1992, the NASD,
the SRO perhaps considered the policy leader among them, responded to
the litigation regarding the applicability of its policies to employment
disputes. It wanted to make clear that employment disputes were to be
arbitrated.76 The SEC approved this proposal, which became effective
October 1, 1993.7' The proposal requires:
arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or
in connection with the business of any member of [the NASD] or
arising out of the employment or termination of employment of
associated person(s) with any member.78
Due to the extensive and "vexing issues confronting" this process,
79
the SEC has reconsidered its position.8° Even though the arbitration
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD").
74. Id. at 13.
75. See id.
76. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Enforcement of Arbitrators' Orders
Under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070 (1993) (proposed July
21, 1993) [hereinafter NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Enforcement]. Previously, it was
not clear whether NASD rules required arbitration of employment disputes. Cf. NYSE Rule
347 (providing for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and
any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such registered representative.").
77. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.;
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Scope of the NASD Arbitration
Code of Procedure, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,932 (1993).
78. NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Enforcement, 58 Fed. Reg. at 39,070. Prior to
this proposed rule, the rule in effect did not specifically address employment disputes. It
merely provided "for the arbitration of any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in
connection with the business of any member of [NASD]." See Williams v. Cigna Fin.
Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1995).
79. John F. X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, Guide to Recommendations of Ruder's Task
Force, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 15, 1993, at 3 (discussing the many problems with arbitration
discussed by the NASD Arbitration Policy Task Force, including panel selection, discovery,
decisions, and damages).
80. See Self-Regulatory Commission Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164 (1997) (proposed Dec. 17, 1997)
[hereinafter NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration] (providing notice of proposed
rule change that securities employees are no longer required to arbitrate claims of statutory
employment discrimination); SEC Commissioner to Push for End to Mandatory Arbitration,
WALL ST. LETTER, Dec. 1, 1997, at 7 (reporting that for one SEC commissioner, ending
mandatory employment arbitration in his field was a top priority). Finally, in June 1998, the
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mandate passed in 1993 and was reaffirmed in 1995,81 forces coalesced
that, by early 1997, caused the SROs to reexamine their support for
mandatory employment arbitration. 2
By October 1997, the NASD filed a proposed rule change with the
SEC that "remove[s] the requirement to arbitrate claims of statutory
employment discrimination." 3 The SEC approval of the proposal nullifies
the present system of mandatory arbitration and allows parties the choice to
bring their claims in court or in an alternative forum.4 Moreover, in
October 1998, the NYSE published proposed rule changes that would
exclude employment discrimination claims from arbitration. 5 These rule
changes and proposals are discussed in Part I infra and are so recent that
no court has considered them.
The other regulatory agency to have oversight of employment
arbitrations in the securities industry is the EEOC. This agency is charged
with the interpretation and enforcement of U.S. employment discrimination
laws. There are a number of antidiscrimination laws which compose a
wide "statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace
,86nationwide." Even while recognizing that states have a concurrent
SEC announced that it approved the proposed rule change, effective January 1, 1999. See
Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order
Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109 (June 22, 1998), available in
1998 SEC LEXIS 1223 [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109]; see also Michael
Delikat & Lisa K. McClelland, Mandatory Arbitration Gets Closer to Supreme Court
Review, N.Y. L.J., June 19, 1998, at 1.
81. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Procedures for Large and
Complex Arbitration Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 7241 (1995).
82. See NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,166
(discussing congressional and regulatory pressures for changing the mandatory system);
ARBrrRATION POLICY TASK FORCE (NASD), REPORT ON SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM
(Jan. 1996) [hereinafter NASD TASK FORCE] (presenting numerous recommendations to
improve the process); COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
(DUNLOP COMM'N), U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMM'N] (stating its belief that not all
workplace disputes may be solved through in-house binding arbitration).
83. NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,166,
84. See id.; see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109, supra note 80; cf. DUNLOP
COMM'N, supra note 82 (noting that certain claims, such as those involving civil rights
allegations, may not be appropriate for consideration by arbitrators whose main focus is on
financial arbitration).
85. See Self Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes by
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Arbitration Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,782
(1998) [hereinafter NYSE Proposed Rule].
86. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995); see also
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96(i)
(1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5 (1994);
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enforcement role, Congress emphasized that the federal government has the
ultimate enforcement responsibility. 87 Arbitration of employment disputes
does not undermine the EEOC's role, as the agency may still receive
information and has independent authority to investigate claims. It may
bring charges in a case" or issue a right to sue letter to the plaintiffs. 9
EEOC claims may be litigated or resolved through ADR or even settled-
all with, or without, the Agency's help.90  Beyond the EEOC's
jurisdictional and legal bases for enforcing these laws, it actually possesses
limited power even to order or prohibit binding arbitration of employment
disputes. Historically, the SEC always has trumped the EEOC in the
making of arbitration agreements in the securities industry. The EEOC has
consistently and officially stated that the right to a judicial forum is
nonwaivable, and the agency has opposed binding arbitration agreements
reasoning that they "are contrary to the fundamental principles evinced in
these laws." 91 Even though the agency is mindful of Gilmer, it gives courts
rather than arbitrators "primary responsibility" for the development and
interpretation of civil rights law.92 Even with all of the EEOC's opposition
to binding arbitration, it has generally not been at the forefront litigating
these cases.93 In fact, of all the cases discussed and cited in the following
section, the EEOC is a named party in just two.
B. Judicial Decisions on Whether Individuals Have Prospectively Waived
Their Right to a Judicial Forum by Signing a Securities Industry U-4
Form
Notwithstanding Gilmer, it is unclear whether employees have waived
their statutory rights under civil rights statutes other than the ADEA.94 Of
the lower courts to have considered this issue, clearly the majority favors
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994); Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ (amending scattered sections) (1994).
87. See 118 CoNG. REc. 4941 (1972).
88. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.4, 1626.13 (1998); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 1626 (1998).
90. See Cooper, supra note 8, at 209. The reality of the agency's cameo role in
enforcement of these laws is discussed as well. See id.
91. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 3.
92. Id.; see also Enforcement Guidance, supra note 3, at N:2329.
93. One need only look at the names in Sections B and C infra to see that the EEOC has
not persistently pursued the claims alleged. See also Cooper, supra note 8, at 219-20; cf.
EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 3 (discussing that the EEOC has challenged agreements
by submitting amicus curiae briefs to courts).
94. See generally Ellwood F. Oakley, I1 & Donald 0. Mayer, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenges of Contemporary Federalism, 47
S.C. L. Rnv. 475,477-79 (1996).
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extending Gilmer to mandate arbitration of other civil rights in employment
claims. This section discusses, circuit-by-circuit, the controlling cases, or
should none be on point, the closest relevant discrimination case. Federal
district court cases are discussed as well.
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit is among the majority jurisdictions that expand and
apply Gilmer to compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims.9' In Rosenberg
v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,96 the court considered
whether "Congress intended to prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements covering employment discrimination claims under
Title VII... as a matter of law in all cases or at least under certain facts
said to be present here." 97 After being fired, Rosenberg filed suit alleging
age and sex discrimination, and Merrill Lynch moved to enforce the
agreement compelling arbitration under NYSE rules.
While the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the denial of
Merrill Lynch's motion based on these particular facts, it held as a matter
of law that such agreements may be valid.9 In construing relevant law, and
directly following Gilmer, the court first found that the 1991 Act does not
automatically preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements.99 Second, the
court considered whether compulsory arbitration is inconsistent with the
framework and purposes of Title VII. ° After analyzing the NYSE arbitral
scheme, the court found, contrary to the finding of the District Court, that
there was no conclusive evidence of bias or other structural and systemic
shortcomings that undermine the vindicating of Title VII rights.' ' After
considering several other of Rosenberg's assertions and rejecting them, the
court agreed with one point: that this agreement was unenforceable in that
95. See infra discussion of cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits.
96. No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 80964 (1st Cir. Feb. 24, 1999).
97. Id. at *1. See generally Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir.
1998) (compelling arbitration of ADA claim since that statute explicitly encourages ADR,
and Gilmer controls outcome). But see Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding that employee who signed a U-4 form could not be compelled to
arbitrate Title VII claim due to that statute's "unique nature").
98. See Rosenberg, 1999 WL 80964, at *1.
99. See id. at *9 (relying on language from the 1991 Act encouraging ADR and on
language from Gilmer promoting arbitration unless there is congressional intent to preclude
arbitration, in finding that there is no conflict between Title VII and arbitration).
100. See id. (adopting Gilmer and finding no inherent defects in arbitration that render it
unsuitable for resolution of statutory claims).
101. See id. at *13 (citing what the circuit court characterizes as numerous
misinterpretations by the district court, which found structural and systemic infirmities in
the compulsory arbitration system).
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Merrill Lynch simply failed to give Rosenberg a copy of the NYSE rules
(which detailed the arbitration scheme).' °2
The court then explicitly adopted Gilmer to govern Title VII claims
and made short work of the many recent contentions of weaknesses in
industry-run compulsory arbitration systems. °3 Mindful too of Wright, the
court carefully scrutinized the parties' agreement, finding it incomplete.
4
So while the First Circuit did not compel arbitration, its decision was
essentially limited to these facts. 105
2. Second Circuit
As New York is the headquarters for many financial institutions and
the home of Wall Street, it, not surprisingly, has the largest volume of all
American cities of this litigation. This circuit is presently in a state of flux
regarding securities industry employment arbitration. In the 1996 case
Thomas James Associates, Inc. v. Jameson,10 6 the court found "that a
registered representative's employment-related claim against an NASD-
member employer was arbitrable under the NASD Code."1°7 The court of
appeals further stated that employment disputes were required to be
arbitrated even before the 1993 NASD Amendment. l0 s While the court was
not asked to consider its holding in the context of Title VII discrimination
claims, it appears unlikely that this court would distinguish between the
two types of claims. Notably absent from this opinion was any discussion
of whether employees' rights are effectively protected under the arbitral
system. It is important to start with a case like Jameson and contrast its
outcome with more recent 1998 cases, in which the Second Circuit departs
from its former unwavering support of the existing system of employment
arbitration.
In Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.,1°9 the court found that the arbitrators
102. See id. at *20 n.15 (reasoning that Merrill Lynch bears the risk of such
incompleteness).
103. Seeid. at*14.
104. See id. at *21-22; see also Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391
(1998) (unanimous opinion) (declining to compel arbitration where the waiver of a judicial
forum clause in a CBA was not clear and unmistakable); cf LaChance v. Northeast Publ'g,
Inc., 965 F. Supp. at 177 (refusing to extend Gilmer to ADA and ADEA claims arising out
of a CBA).
105. See Rosenberg, 1999 WL 80964, at *22.
106. 102 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 64.
108. See id. at 64 n.1; cf DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 (1998) (confirming an arbitration award for ADEA
claims).
109. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
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"manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence or both.""0  Courts are
increasingly willing to consider procedural and systemic inadequacies as
they take note of such cases from other jurisdictions. The Halligan court
found "strong evidence that Halligan was fired because of his age" and
"that the arbitrators were correctly advised [by both parties] of the
applicable legal principles."'1' While arbitrators have no obligation to
explain their decisions-and they did not in this case--"an[y]
explanation... would have strained credulity." 112 Throughout the opinion,
the court noted the greater levels of scrutiny and controversy currently
surrounding employment arbitration."
3
Reflecting the Second Circuit's ambivalence in EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Company,114 the court refused to allow the EEOC
independently to seek monetary damages in court for individuals who had
all signed PDAAs. 115 Judge Feinberg, in a concurrence, agreed with the
result but persuasively questioned whether statutory rights "can be
vindicated equally well [under the present system of arbitration] as they are
in the courts .... The area of arbitration of statutory rights in the securities
industry may need to be reexamined in order to properly protect
employees."".6
Finally, in an interesting twist to a class action settlement between
Smith Barney and female employees, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied final approval of the settlement reasoning that
it was not fair, adequate, or reasonable."7 The judge raised objections inter
alia to the lack of a guaranteed damages fund, the uncertainty as to the
arbitration process, the inadequacy of employer diversity initiatives, and
the lack of provision for replacement of the culpable personnel."' Clearly,
the Second Circuit has reconsidered its previously unquestioned support of
securities arbitration.
There are a considerable number of pre-1998 district court cases, all of
which compelled arbitration of discrimination claims. In these cases the
district courts rejected the argument that there was no knowing waiver of
110. Id. at 204.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 202-04. Compare Halligan with Campbell v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 21
F. Supp. 2d 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), in which the court distinguished Halligan. The Campbell
court confirmed the arbitral decision since there was no evidence that arbitrators manifestly
disregarded the law. See generally Carroll E. Neesemann, Second Circuit Decision Heralds
Fundamental Changes to Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., July 24, 1998, at 1.
114. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
115. See id. at 300-01.
116. Id. at 304 (citations ommitted).
117. Martens v. Smith Barney Inc., No. 96 CIV. 3779 (CBM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9226 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1998).
118. See id.; see also infra note 265 and accompanying text.
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statutory rightsl 9 or other defect in the making of the contract, and they
upheld agreements for the spectrum of discrimination claims, including
those based on religion, age, race, sex, national origin, and sexual
harassment.' 20
3. Third Circuit
There are, at this time, two major circuit court decisions diametrically
opposed: the Third Circuit case, Seus v. John Nuveen and Co.,'2' and the
Nint Ciruitcase DufCo.122Ninth Circuit case, Duffeld v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 2 discussed
infra. In 1996, Seus filed suit in federal district court against Nuveen
alleging Title VII and age discrimination claims.'2 Concluding that the
Form U-4 that Seus executed was a valid agreement that covered the claims
asserted, the court granted Nuveen's motion to dismiss the complaint.' 24
Interestingly, Seus motioned the court to depose the NASD.' 25 This request
was denied. On review, a three-judge panel in the Third Circuit affirmed
both the dismissal of the case and denial of the motion.'
26
The court first found that there was an agreement to arbitrate after
reviewing case law and the language of the FAA, ADEA, OWBPA, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.12' With respect to this last statute,
119. See Schuetz v. CS First Boston Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11612 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 1997).
120. See id. at *1-2; see also Stitz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, No. 94 Civ. 3280
(JSM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11357 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1997); Rice v. Brown Bros.
Harriman & Co., No. 96 Civ. 6326 (MBM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3628 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
20, 1997); Pilanski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 96 Civ. 10292 (DC), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15963 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1996); Smith v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 10326
(JSM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9485 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1996); Friedman v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., No. 95 Civ. 10096, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19889 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1996);
Kurschus v. Painewebber, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1652 (PKL), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1996); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613 (DLC), 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1140 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1996); Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp.
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Gateson v. ASLK-Bank, 94 Civ. 5849 (RPP), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9004 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1995); Hall v. MetLife Resources, No. Civ. 0358 (JFK), 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5812 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1995); Moore v. Interacciones Global, Inc., No. 94
Civ. 4789 (RWS), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 971 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1995); Scher v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 866 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See generally Fletcher v. Kidder
Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1993) (state's highest court upholding arbitration
agreement).
121. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No. 98-719, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 1046 (Feb.
22, 1999).
122. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
123. See Seus, 146 F.3d at 175.
124. See id. at 184.
125. See id. at 178.
126. See id. at 187-88.
127. See id. at 178-83.
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the court declared that "§ 118 evinces a clear congressional intent to
encourage arbitration of Title VII and ADEA claims," and disagreed with
the Duffield court's reading of the section. 11 In upholding the agreement's
validity, the court rejected assertions that it was not made knowingly and
voluntarily, and that it was invalid as a contract of adhesion, or even a
yellow-dog contract. 29 The court further held that the agreement covered
the claims in question. Even though the Form U-4 was signed in 1982, the
Third Circuit joined the majority of courts in finding that employees must
comply with the rules as they existed at the time of the dispute."O
Without considering any of the more complex issues at play in this
case, the court relied on this relatively narrow two-part construct and then
summarily finished the case. The hostility to Seus' claims is palpable in
the opinion. Seus supported her motion to depose the NASD with the
claim that "current NASD procedures [were] inadequate to protect her
statutory and due process rights.'. 3 1 As evidence of this, she referred to the
NASD's recent decision to abandon compulsory arbitration.12  Seus
attempted to determine
the race, sex, age and professional backgrounds of the arbitrators,
the procedures for selecting arbitrators, the cost of arbitration, the
percentage of arbitration cases involving age and sex
employment discrimination claims, the specific results of the
arbitration decisions in employment discrimination cases, the
location and scheduling of hearings, and the timeliness of
decisions. 33
The information sought in Seus' motion related to the normally
private functions of securities arbitration and is totally relevant to questions
of fairness and due process. The motion was unfortunately and, I propose,
wrongfully denied.
The Third Circuit in In re Prudential Insurance Company noted that
the employees were bound by their U-4 forms, since the NASD intended
the 1993 amendments "to be read broadly so that employment disputes that
128. Id. at 182.
129. See id. at 184 (noting that nothing "short of a showing of fraud, duress, mistake or
some other ground recognized by the law as applicable to contracts generally would have
excused the district court from enforcing Seus's agreement"). A yellow dog contract refers
to an earlier employer practice in which employees had to waive their right to join a union
in order to obtain employment. This practice was invalidated by the Norris-LaGuardia Act
of 1932,29 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
130. See Seus, 146 F.3d at 185-87.
131. Id. at 187.
132. See id. Just a few weeks after this decision was published, an NASD official stated
that "[w]e believe statutory-discrimination claims are different from other kinds of business
claims." Mark T. Kuiper, NASD Modifies Its Arbitration Rules, BOND BUYER, June 25,
1998, at 37.
133. Seus, 146 F.3d at 188 n.6.
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also invoked matters 'involving public policy issues' would still be
arbitrated."1 34 The opinion, of course, includes no discussion of what the
EEOC may have intended in trying to enforce the antidiscrimination laws.
Further, in Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, the Third Circuit
also agreed to compel arbitration of Title VII claims pursuant to a general
business arbitration clause. 35  The court adamantly disagreed with
Peacock's contention that the FAA excludes mandatory arbitration of
employment contracts.
136
Moreover, when federal district courts in the Third Circuit considered
cases on point previously, they concluded that the plaintiffs were bound to
arbitrate all claims including those based upon Title VII, ADEA, and
related state law claims. 13 7 The courts found that arbitration procedures




Although there is no circuit case on point, the Supreme Court recently
decided Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation.39 In a
unanimous opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that the CBA governing Wright's
employment did not contain a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of his right
to a judicial forum for resolution of his ADA claim.' 4° Acknowledging that
"[t]here is obviously some tension between" the Gilmer and Gardner-
Denver line of cases, the Court attempted to read them as harmoniously as
possible.'4' It construed the latter case to "at least [stand] for the
proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient
importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a
CBA."' 42 Thus, the Court would deny access to a judicial forum only in
limited circumstances, finding that covered employees' statutory claims are
"not subject to a presumption of arbitrability."' 43
134. 133 F.3d 225,233 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 39,070, 39,071-72 (1993)).
135. 110 F.3d 222, 224, 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 299 (1997).
136. See id. at 226-27.
137. See, e.g., Lepera v. ITr Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12328 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11,
1997) (ordering arbitration of employment dispute involving tort claims); Kaliden v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 179, 182 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (extending Gilmer to
state statutes).
138. See Lepera, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12328; Kaliden, 789 F. Supp. at 182.




143. Id.; see also Hooters v. Phillips, No. 4:96-3360-22, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3962
(D.S.C. Mar. 12, 1998) (on appeal); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Limits Scope of
Arbitration Pacts, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1998, at All.
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Two years earlier, the Fourth Circuit had decided a case involving a
CBA as well. '44 The difference in outcomes mirrors the changes in the
Second Circuit, and serves as a reminder that the law is constantly
evolving.
In Austin, the court ordered arbitration of the plaintiff's Title VII and
ADA claims, reasoning that the CBA specifically provided that claims of
gender and disability discrimination were to be referred to arbitration. 45 In
a particularly persuasive dissent, Judge Hall reminded the court of
Gardner-Denver and the rule that a labor union, through a CBA, "may not
prospectively waive a member's individual's right to choose a judicial
forum for a statutory claim."146.
5. Fifth Circuit
This circuit emphatically endorses the majority view. The Fifth
Circuit decided Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 47 shortly
after Seus and Duffield, the opposing circuit court decisions. In a matter of
first impression, the Mouton court considered whether a securities dealer
who has agreed to arbitrate any dispute is required to arbitrate his Title VII
discrimination claim. 41 Making quick work of Mouton's assertions, the
court joined the majority and compelled him to submit his Title VII claims
to arbitration.1 49 Though the court acknowledged the Duffield decision, it
failed to grapple seriously with the issues and instead took the easy way
out. For example, the court strictly adhered to judicial precedent, and the
opinion is devoid of any mention of the present controversy surrounding
the arbitration system. Moreover, with the exception of Seus and Duffield,
every decision cited for authority on point is outdated and currently of
questionable validity.
Previously, the Fifth Circuit decided Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. in which the court held that "Title VII claims are properly subject to
arbitration under the analysis in Gilmer."150  In this pre-1993 NASD
144. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 886-87 (Hall, J., dissenting); cf Zandford v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 112
F.3d 723 (4th Cir. 1997) (compelling arbitration of breach of contract and other state law
claims); Riley v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (finding
plaintiff's ADA claim could not be waived since the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the CBA did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing his judicial remedies).
147. 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998).
148. See id. at 454.
149. See id. at 457; see also Thomas v. Bear Steams & Co., No. 97-74870, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15440 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 1998).
150. 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992). Alford has a long history. In light of Gilmer,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, then vacated and remanded the circuit's earlier
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amendment case, the court found that the Title VII claims were arbitrable
and so rejected out of hand the applicability of the Gardner-Denver
decision upon which its earlier decision had been based.
151
An interesting district court opinion, though not directly on point,
refused to compel arbitration, reasoning that the company's "ADR Policy"
was "so misleading and against the principles of Title VII... that its use
violate[d] such law. 152 It is just like the second case discussed thus far
brought by the EEOC.
Litigation over mandatory arbitration has spawned another class of
related lawsuits-arbitrator liability lawsuits. The Fifth Circuit considered
a suit against the arbitrators in which the plaintiff alleged that American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") panels were biased."' The plaintiff
maintained that the AAA did not disclose that most of the potential
arbitrators would be defense attorneys whose clients use AAA services.1 4
6. Sixth Circuit
This circuit has had the opportunity to consider employment
arbitration twice and has found that employment claims under federal civil
rights statutes could be the subject of an enforceable arbitration
agreement. 55 While both cases are older and consider arbitration clauses
prior to the 1993 NASD Amendment, the court made clear that Gilmer is
the controlling authority. In Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., the
decision in Alford. See 500 U.S. 930 (1991), vacating and remanding 905 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir. 1990). The next decision reached was 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), which remanded
the case to district court, ruling that Title VII claims may be subjected to compulsory
arbitration. The district court granted Dean Witter's motion to compel arbitration. Alford
appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that ruling. See 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992). See
generally Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding an
arbitration clause need not speak directly to employment-related disputes for it to mandate
arbitration of Title VII claims).
151. See id. at 1162-64. The court hinted that it may consider, in an appropriate future
case, whether the parties' agreement was a contract of adhesion. See id. at 1163; see also
Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding an arbitration
agreement in U-4 form enforceable for ADEA and Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
claims); cf. Folse v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 56 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 136 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1998) (ordering compensation dispute back to arbitration as per
the parties' agreement).
152. EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, No. H-95-755, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6140 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1995); see supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text (discussing
lack of clarity in Wright's CBA regarding arbitration).
153. See Brenda Sapino, Arbitrators' Fairness at Issue in Appeal: Ex-Employee Protests
Being Forced to Take Her Sexual Harassment Claim to Panel of "White, Male, Defense
Attorneys," TEX. LAW., Nov. 6, 1995, at 4.
154. See id.
155. See Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 105 F.3d 659 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 169 (1997).
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plaintiff filed suit alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of
Title VII as well as state law claims.156 The suit was filed in 1992. The
Sixth Circuit considered the case in 1997, and stated that it is "well-settled
that statutory claims may be the" subject of compulsory arbitration. 157 The
court ruled that parties' agreements will be upheld unless there is evidence
of fraud or duress and expressly declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's
"knowing waiver" standard.158  Judge Craig Daughtrey stressed in her
concurrence that courts should carefully scrutinize whether agreements are
truly the result of a "meeting of the minds" and a "bargained-for result of
discussions between equally astute business entities." ' 9 Judge Daughtrey
the court to remand the case "to ensure that employees are not unwittingly
stripped" of a judicial forum.'60
7. Seventh Circuit
It is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit should be considered a
majority jurisdiction, compelling arbitration of security industry
employees' civil rights claims. The one case on point is a pre-1993
Amendment case, Kresock v. Bankers Trust Co.,16 which notes that the
1993 U-4 Form language alterations "sweep into the realm of arbitration a
whole new class of disputes." 162 Accordingly, the court seems to indicate
that Title VII and other claims may be required to go to arbitration.
The law has evolved, however, and two more recent cases, though not
on point, are highly relevant and merit discussion. In these cases involving
CBAs, the Seventh Circuit followed the Gardner-Denver line of cases
163allowing plaintiffs to litigate their ADA and Title VII claims in court .Apparently, the court has moved beyond the Kresock analysis. In Gibson
156. See id. at 659.
157. Id.; see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir.
1991).
158. See Cosgrove, 105 F.3d at 659; see infra notes 174-194 and accompanying text
(discussing the Ninth Circuit rule and in particular, Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299 (9th Cir. 1994)). In fact, a federal district court in this circuit criticized the Lai
decision, considering itself fortunate not to be bound thereby. See Beauchamp v. Great
West Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
159. Cosgrove, 105 F.3d 659.
160. Id.
161. 21 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 178-79; cf Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995)
(compelling arbitration of ADEA claim as per Gilmer).
163. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 294 (1997) (allowing plaintiff to proceed with Title VII claim); Spyrnal v.
Prudential Ins. Co., No. 96 Civ. 8544, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12607 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14,
1997) (denying motion to compel arbitration of ADA claim by employee covered by CBA).
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v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc.,164 the court instead asked "[w]hether
the prerogative of litigating one's Title VII and ADA claims in federal
court is the type of important right the relinquishment of which requires a
knowing and voluntary waiver."'165 The resonance of the Ninth Circuit's
Lai decision is clear in this opinion, which suggests that a court's asking a
question is as important as its answer. It seems this circuit court now
would not automatically compel arbitration of these claims.166
8. Eighth Circuit
This circuit is a majority jurisdiction and has endorsed arbitration as
the sole remedy for employment disputes within the securities industry.
The court of appeals in Kiernan v. Piper Jaffi-ay Co. refused to vacate an
arbitration award based on an ADA claim and various state law claims. 67
The appeals court also recently considered whether a health care industry
employee who signed an arbitration clause as a condition precedent to
employment is compelled to arbitrate her Title VII claims.161 The court
viewed Gilmer as dispositive, ruling that even Title VII employment
discrimination claims are subject to binding arbitration.
169
The federal district courts of this circuit have had the opportunity to
consider Title VII claims in the securities industry. Most recently, in Battle
v. Prudential Insurance Co.,17° a court compelled arbitration of an
employee's age and race discrimination claims. Moreover, it found that the
NASD required arbitration of such claims even before the 1993 NASD
amendment. The court declined to adopt Lai and pronounced that the law
was "clear" on this issue and that such agreements will be "upheld and
enforced save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."'171 The court noted, however, that it would not
164. 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997).
165. Id. at 1129 (finding employee's promise to arbitrate unenforceable due to a lack of
consideration); cf Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1993).
166. There are two district court cases on point, however, which resoundingly support
the arbitration of employment disputes but may be of questioned vitality due to the
aforementioned circuit court cases. In the first of these cases, Kresock, the plaintiff raised a
number of outstanding points, none of which were resolved in her favor. Similar points
were raised in Rosenberg but with a different outcome. See, e.g., Cremin v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Nieminski v. John Nuveen
& Co., No. 96 C 1960, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 764 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1997).
167. 137 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1998).
168. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 833-34 (8th Cir. 1997).
169. See id. at 837-38; cf. Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997) (considering a Title VII claim by employee
covered by a CBA and citing with approval Gardner-Denver).
170. 974 F. Supp. 861 (D. Minn. 1997).
171. Id. at 866 (citation omitted).
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compel arbitration of civil rights claims in the collective bargaining
172context. Another district court upheld the arbitration agreement, but
cautioned that it would not have done so if there had existed a "well-
founded claim that the arbitration agreement resulted from the exercise of
overwhelming economic power. "
173
9. Ninth Circuit
The most outstanding circuit court case today is the Ninth Circuit case
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.1 74 It resembles Rosenberg v. Merrill
Lynch and stands in opposition to Seus. In 1995, Duffield brought suit
against Robertson in federal district court alleging sexual discrimination
and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, along with state contract
and tort claims.1 75 Duffield requested a declaratory judgment that securities
industry employees cannot be compelled to arbitrate their employment
disputes under Form U-4.1 76 She contended that the agreement was neither
knowing nor voluntary, that it does not protect substantive rights, and that
the U-4 form is a contract of adhesion.1 77 After reconsidering, the district
court certified its orders for immediate appeal. As to Duffield's
contentions in her motion for declaratory judgment, the circuit court judges
prefaced their analysis with the observation that:
[Never [have we] been required to consider the effect of the
1991 Act on the much more difficult question before us today:
the enforceability of compulsory arbitration provisions that, as a
condition of employment, compel persons to forego their
statutory right to judicial relief with respect to future claims of
Title VII discrimination, and to submit all such future claims to
binding arbitration.
178
Prior to this case, the court decided the well-known case of Prudential
172. See id.; cf. Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996).
173. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 1456.
174. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998).
175. See id. at 1186.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 1189. The Ninth Circuit, though, has decided a fair number of these cases
which will be discussed infra. See also Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d
756 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Lai's knowing waiver analysis to an ADA claim and finding
no automatic arbitration); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that Lai is not applicable to Fair Labor Claims Act and so compelled
arbitration); Painewebber, Inc. v. Bahr, 97 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding arbitration
order despite claim of fraud); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying Gilmer rather than Gardner-Denver to Title VII claim); Nadeau v.
Thomas, No. 96-20383SW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12633 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 1997)
(denying petition to compel arbitration).
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Insurance Co. v. Lai,179 ruling that claimants who do not "knowingly"
agree to arbitrate Title VII claims are not required to submit to arbitration.
This was reaffirmed in Renteria v. Prudential Insurance Co.180 regarding
Title VII and related state law claims.
After considerable analysis of the 1991 Act and section 118, the
Duffield court concluded that the text is, "at a minimum, ambiguous,"' 8'1
that arbitration is "encouraged" "where appropriate," and that the
legislative history of section 118 "plainly demonstrate[s] that in allowing
arbitration... Congress intended to adopt Gardner-Denver's firm rule
precluding enforcement of compulsory agreements to arbitrate future Title
VII claims, not Gilmer's possible validation of such agreements.' 8 2 Thus,
the court concluded that Form U-4 is unenforceable as applied to Title VII
claims. 8 3 The court noted that the 1991 Act does not preclude voluntary or
post-dispute agreements to arbitrate and recognized the many benefits of
arbitration. l 4 Because the court held that the 1991 Act precludes
compulsory arbitration, it did not reach Duffield's more provocative claims
that she did not "knowingly" agree to arbitrate her Title VII claims and that
the NYSE forum fails adequately to protect her statutory rights.'
Regarding Duffield's assertions that the Form U-4 imposes an
unconstitutional condition of employment, the appeals court found that
there was an insufficient level of state action for the government fairly to
be said to be encouraging the mandatory arbitration requirement.
8 6
Therefore, Duffield did not forfeit her constitutional rights.'87 In response
to the Duffield decision, JAMS/Endispute, the nation's largest private ADR
firm, announced that it will not arbitrate Title VII claims in the Ninth
179. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. Mago, 956 F.2d 932.
180. 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1995).
181. 144F.3dat 1193.
182. Id. at 1195.
183. See id. at 1199. But see Seus, 146 F.3d 175 (finding that the 1991 Act requires Title
VII claims to be arbitrated under the language of Form U-4).
184. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193. This court found that while a compulsory
arbitration rule cannot be read into the 1991 Act, voluntary arbitration is within the law. See
id.; cf. Nghiem v. NEC Elec., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that plaintiffs who
voluntarily initiate arbitration proceedings are bound thereby); Gail Diane Cox, Court
Strikes Arbitration Clause, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 8, 1999, at B2 (reporting on a California state
appellate opinion in which the judge refused to order arbitration of employment claims
reasoning the ADR clause was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable).
185. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190. These claims, beyond the question of the meaning
of the 1991 Act, are among the more complex, nuanced issues relating to systemic bias and
to general structural faults in the industry-sponsored arbitration forum. The question of
adequate protections harks back to Gilmer and Mitsubishi.
186. See id. at 1185.
187. See id. at 1185; cf Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965
F. Supp. 190, 192 (D. Mass. 1997) (contemplating these assertions as well), affd on other
grounds, 163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Circuit.' s The Ninth Circuit, the nation's largest, includes California,
Washington, Arizona, Oregon, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana. Accordingly,
Duffield's claims will be bifurcated, with the two discrimination charges
being heard in court and the other claims being considered by an arbitrator.
After Duffield, and before the Supreme Court's decision in Wright, the
Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc.189 With
regard to this workplace ADA discrimination claim, the court held the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was neither explicitly
presented nor accepted.'9 0 An interesting twist to the law in this area
occurred in Imhoff v. Charles Schwab and Co.' 91 Imhoff signed the Form
U-4, in which both the NASD and NYSE were selected as forums for
processing disputes.192  Inhoff brought suit alleging employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII, ADA, ADEA, and state law.
Finding itself constrained to apply Lai (which decided a NASD claim) to
NASD arbitrations, the plaintiff was not bound to arbitrate under NASD
rules. 93  However, the court ordered arbitration under NYSE rules
reasoning that the Lai case was not applicable to NYSE claims. 19 4 Clearly
such a dichotomous result is undesirable, and the various exchanges must
adopt congruous rules to prevent forum shopping.
10. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit is clearly a majority jurisdiction. In the leading
case from this circuit, Armijo v. Prudential Insurance Co.,' 95 the plaintiffs
claimed that they were terminated because of their race, sex, or national
origin.1 6 Defendants moved to compel arbitration of claims under the U-4
Form that plaintiffs signed. Finding a presumption of arbitrability under
both pre- and post-1993 U-4 provisions that was not rebutted, the court
affirmed the decision to compel arbitration.'97
Most recently, the Tenth Circuit in Schooley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
188. See JAMS/Endispute Announces New Arbitration Policy for Ninth Circuit Title VII
Claims, Bus. WiRE, Oct. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, US File.
189. 152 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1998).
190. See id.
191. No. CIV-97-1779-PHX-RDS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1178 (D. Ariz. Jan. 14, 1998)
(as stated by LEXIS-NEXIS, "The Opinion Previously Reported at this Citation has been




195. 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
196. See id. at 796.
197. See id. at 798-99; see also Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 39 F.3d
1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., No. 93-2418-GTV, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1201 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994).
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Fenner & Smith'" ordered arbitration of claims that included tortious
breach of contract, constructive discharge, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and fraudulent
contractual interference. The court rejected Schooley's challenges,
reasoning that federal policies favor arbitration and preempt other
policies. 19 9
11. Eleventh Circuit
This circuit is also a majority jurisdiction. The controlling case in this
circuit is Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.2 ° Former securities
201sales agents brought suit against Equitable alleging race discrimination.
Equitable moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration of the
claims.2 2 Finding that the former employees "signed the U-4 forms
promising to arbitrate any disputes," the court reversed the district court
decision, concluding that the claims were subject to arbitration.2 3  The
court made quick work of each of the former employees' points of
contention, noting that arbitration of employment disputes at NASD
member firms has been required even prior to 1975.204
Although not directly on point, a very recent related Eleventh Circuit
opinion seems to echo the ambivalence most recently generated by the
central issue of this Article. °5 The court in Paladino ruled on a motion by
the employer to compel arbitration of a fired employee's Title VII
claims. 206 The court seemed eager to find deficiencies in the parties'
agreement and thus deny the motion to compel arbitration.27 In fact, Chief
Judge Hatchett found that the arbitration clause did not include Title VII
claims. 28  Moreover, this same circuit recently refused to compel
arbitration of a disability claim because the arbitration clause was part of a
198. 107 F.3d 21 (10th Cir. 1997).
199. See id.




203. Id. at 520.
204. See id. (quoting Association of Inv. Brokers v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n,
676 F.2d 857, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). An older case also upheld an order compelling
arbitration of a Title VII claim. See Bender v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698
(llth Cir. 1992).
205. See Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998).
206. See id. at 1056.
207. See id. at 1058.
208. See id. This is so despite the concurrence urging the court to rule that the
arbitration clause includes Title VII claims.
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CBA.209
12. District of Columbia Circuit
While this Circuit has not decided a securities industry employment
discrimination case, it has produced an influential opinion closely related to
this subject.210 In Cole, after the employee was fired from his job, he filed
a complaint alleging, inter alia, discrimination and harassment based on
race.21' The defendant moved to compel arbitration of these claims.212 The
court reluctantly upheld the parties' agreement because "we are constrained
by Gilmer... [which requires] the enforcement of arbitration agreements
that do not undermine the relevant statutory scheme.2 13 This is precisely
the question and analysis that Gilmer asks courts to consider, yet not every
court has complied. It seems many courts are merely asking whether the
agreement is signed and whether the dispute is within the agreement.
These courts end the analysis at that point, never questioning the substance
or effect of the agreement. The Cole court took efforts to distinguish this
individual dispute from a collectively bargained one 14 and made clear that
it was cognizant of the reported "inequities and inadequacies of arbitration
in individual employment cases. 21 5 In conclusion, it found "[a]rbitration
of public law issues... troubling.,
216
A few conclusions can be drawn at this point regarding the
arbitrability of civil rights in employment claims. First,
employment arbitration has arguably reached its zenith. The
securities industry employment arbitration cases from 1993 to
1996, almost without exception, flatly endorse arbitration and
undertake only a cursory analysis of contentions to the contrary.
However, in the most recent cases discussed, those decided from
1997-1998, courts are increasingly willing to explore the more
complex and nuanced aspects to employment arbitration clauses..
There has been a recognition that Gardner-Denver remains vital
and that decisions do not have to fall in lock-step with Gilmer,
which does not technically apply to cases other than ADEA
claims, except by an expansive and not entirely defensible
analogy. The extensive and continuing negative coverage
209. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
210. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
211. See id. at 1467.
212. See id.
213. Id. at 1467-68.
214. See id. at 1467, 1472-76.
215. Id. at 1467.
216. Id. at 1476; cf. Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299 (D.C.
1994) (upholding arbitration of sex discrimination claims brought under the District of
Columbia Human Rights Act).
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highlighting the present system's inequities has added another
dimension hastening this evolution.217
Since the arbitration of financial securities disputes became the law
with McMahon, then Rodriguez de Quijas and then with ADEA disputes,
federal and state courts have rapidly expanded the law by reading into these
decisions a requirement that all employment claims must be arbitrated.
Perhaps not ready or capable of handling the complexities involved in this
new class of disputes and recognizing that the present system is flawed,
there has been a retreat from this expansive view that arbitration covers all
statutory employment disputes.
In terms of influence, the Rosenberg, Lai, Cole, and Pryner cases
stand out as thoughtful, well-researched, and well-written opinions. The
two cases that will share the spotlight as defining decisions, though, are
Seus and Duffield. Their clashing values and completely opposite
outcomes may presage consideration of the issue by the Supreme Court.2 8
I. THE CHALLENGES, STRATEGIES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
STABILIZING THE SYSTEM
Compulsory arbitration of employment disputes for NASD-member
firms in the securities industry, an uncompromising fixture for many years,
has been phased out. One caveat to bear in mind, however, is that this
direction has only been taken so far by the NASD. The NYSE, another
major player, has such a proposal pending before the SEC, and it remains
to be seen what policy other SROs will decide to adopt.2 '9 The NASD,
though, is responsible for handling the vast majority of employment
arbitrations. Parts I and II of this Article outlined the law, case and
statutory, as it is. This Part attempts to flesh out the dynamics of the
changes over the past five years, explaining how the tide has turned and
why. It is also instructive to note the interplay between courts, agencies,
legislatures, plaintiffs, and defendants. Each is a stakeholder in the
employment arbitration process, yet each stockholder's interests and goals
are different.
In one sense, the shift in attitude regarding mandatory arbitration may
be seen as a stunning rebuke of SEC-approved policies. In other ways, it
217. See De'Ann Weimer & Stephanie Anderson Forest, Forced Into Arbitration? Not
Any More, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 16, 1998, at 66; see also Mary E. Bruno & Lawrence J.
Rosenfeld, Duffield Puts Compulsory Arbitration in Doubt, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at B6
(questioning whether the glimmer of Gilmer "has faded").
218. Although the Court denied certiorari in Duffield, the conflict between the circuit
courts remains, and so the Court may in the future consider another similar case.
219. See Peter Truell, Arbitration Rules Relaxed at Brokers, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1998,
at D11 (reporting that the SEC is "encouraging" other SROs to follow the lead of the
NASD).
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may be viewed as a recognition that while parties perceive that it is
important for ADR to be faster and less expensive than litigation, the
cardinal value of systemic fairness has carried the day. The fundamental
flaw of this mandatory arbitration system is the perception, real or
imagined, that it is biased-a system created and managed by the securities
industry, with almost no way out for plaintiffs-the fox guarding the
chicken coop, if you will. It has proven unworkable. This Part is divided
into four sections, followed by a conclusion. Section A discusses how we
arrived at this point and offers some statistics regrading employment
arbitration cases. Section B discusses the employment relationship as it has
involved arbitration. Section C discusses the dynamics of the arbitration
process, from choosing an arbitrator to issues of appealing the decision.
Section D discusses agency responsibility for creating this system and
agency responsibility for enforcing antidiscrimination laws-goals that
have been, to a degree, at cross-purposes. This Section also discusses
challenges to the system and legislative intervention.
A. How Many Cases Are Involved and Why There Is So Much Attention
Focused on These Cases
While reliable neutral statistics are actually difficult to find and
confirm, there are some numbers with which to work. The numbers relate
solely to NASD cases, unless another SRO is identified. Four employment
discrimination cases were filed in 1991,220 the year Gilmer was decided and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted. In 1996, 109 discrimination
cases were filed.221 This figure represents just less than two percent of all
the arbitration cases filed in 1996, of which there were 5,631, the vast
majority representing financial broker-customer disputes
222
The following statistics will further challenge readers who may
already be wondering why there is such a fervent furor against arbitration
when the number of cases is so small. The Securities Industry Association
("SIA"), a trade group representing the interests of over 800 securities
firms, submits that arbitration plaintiffs prevail over defendants more often
than they would have had their cases been litigated.223 For example, NYSE
220. See NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,164 n.2.
221. See id.
222. See NASD Regulation, Inc., NASD Regulation Statistics (visited Mar. 16, 1999)
<http://www.nasdr.com/2380.htm>; see also NASD Proposes Enhancements to Arbitration
of Securities Industry Employment Discrimination Claims, PR NEWVSNVR, Oct. 8, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, US File (stating that in 1997, of the 6,000 claims made,
139 involved discrimination claims).
223. See Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Securities Industry Association to Mary L. Schapiro, President, NASD Regulation, Inc. 3
(Apr. 25, 1997).
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arbitration plaintiffs prevailed in forty-one percent of cases. Twenty-six
percent of the cases were brought in NASD arbitration, and just nineteen
percent of the cases went before the federal trial courts of the Southern
District of New York.224
It is a telling statement of just how poorly the present system is
operating when panel after panel recommends major changes to the
mandatory arbitration system that inspires no confidence in anyone but its
creators. In fact, the system of prospective mandatory binding arbitration
of employment claims is so seriously malfunctioning that even the SIA is
now offering "[s]uggestions for modifying the arbitration process."
215
To place these changes in context, I have provided a rough timeline, a
brief discussion with dates of relevant events that have led to this full-scale
reconsideration of employment arbitration.
1987: McMahon is decided, upholding the use of mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration of broker-customer Exchange Act Claims.
226
1989: Rodriguez de Quijas is decided, expanding the McMahon rule to
Securities Act claims.227
1991: Gilmer is decided, further expanding mandatory arbitration
agreements to cover age discrimination in employment claims.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is passed by Congress, declining to limit
the rule of Gardner-Denver yet at the same time encouraging the use of
ADR.229
1993: NASD amends its rules, clarifying that even employment
disputes are subject to mandatory binding arbitration.230
1994: GAO Report, "How Registered Representatives Fare in
Discrimination Disputes," is issued. It was requested by the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. Finding many flaws,
the Report makes recommendations.23'
224. See id.
225. Id. See generally George Nicolau, Scrutiny of Arbitration Forums Focus on
Fairness, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at B7.
226. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
227. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
228. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
229. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
230. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing NASD rule change).
231. See GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 8-17. This report was requested
by the Hon. Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
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NASD forms an Arbitration Policy Task Force, chaired by a former
232
SEC Chair, to study the system and make recommendations.
Lai is decided and is considered an aberration for its holding that the
employees were not bound by their agreement because "they did not
knowingly contract to forego their statutory remedies. 233
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, known
as the Dunlop Commission, sponsored by the Departments of Labor and
Commerce, issues a report emphasizing that not all workplace disputes can
be resolved through in-house binding arbitration and that such agreements
should not be enforceable as a condition of employment.
234
1995: Individuals from diverse independent organizations involved in
labor and employment law create a Task Force on Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Employment and make numerous suggestions to change the
present system.235
1996: NASD's Arbitration Policy Task Force issues its report
containing more than seventy recommendations,, marking the most
comprehensive restructuring of the securities industry arbitration system. 2 6
The independent American Arbitration Association releases new rules
for the resolution of employment disputes to ensure due process as well as
a fair and equitable forum.7
Finance, of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives.
232. This eight-member task force was appointed in September 1994 by the Board of
Governors of the NASD, which handles 85% of the securities arbitration claims each year.
See NASD PRESS RELEASE, ARBITRATION TASK FORCE TO ISSUE RECOMMENDATIONS IN
LARGEST REVAMPING OF SECURITIEs ARBITRATION SINCE ITS START MORE THAN A CENTURY
AGO (1996).
233. 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
234. See DUNLOP COMM'N, supra note 82. The Commission, appointed by then
Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown and Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich, asked
inter alia, what, if anything, should be done to increase the extent to which workplace
problems are resolved privately rather than through recourse to courts. See id. The
Commission recommended that employers use extreme caution when resorting to non-
judicial options in "light of the important social values embodied in... employment law."
Id.
235. See American Arbitration Association, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and
Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship (visited Mar.
16, 1999) <http://www.adr.org/protocol.html> [hereinafter A Due Process Protocol].
236. See NASD TASK FORCE, supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing Task
Force's mission and results). The 156-page report is a thorough and impressive rendering of
the problems involved in industry-sponsored arbitration, and the recommendations are
generally very thoughtful. See id. The system will most likely be abandoned, however,
before many of these recommendations take effect. See supra notes 82-83 and infra notes
240-46 (discussing the dismantling of present NASD employment arbitration rules).
237. See American Arbitration Association, American Arbitration Association Releases
New National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes to Ensure Due Process,
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1997: Letter from Representatives Edward J. Markey, Anna G. Eshoo,
and Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. to Arthur Levitt, SEC Chair,
questioning whether the NASD's mandatory arbitration policy is even
within the scope of its authority.238 Mr. Levitt responded one month later
acknowledging that sound arguments could be made on both sides of the
issue.239
Federal legislation is introduced into both the House and the Senate
(H.R. 983 and S. 63), known as the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act
of 1997, in an effort to prevent the involuntary application of arbitration to
civil rights claims. 240
NASD Regulation formed an Advisory Committee to assist it in
determining the future of employment arbitration in the securities
industry.241
While this Committee conducted hearings, the EEOC issued a Policy
Statement reiterating its opposition to unilaterally imposed PDAAs,
reasoning that the policy is harmful to both individual civil rights plaintiffs
and to the public interest.242
One month later, the NASD Advisory Committee recommended
amending Rule 10201 of the NASD Code of Arbitration so as to remove
the arbitration requirement for such claims and to continue to improve the
forum for those who may voluntarily wish to use the industry forum. The
NASD accepted the recommendation and requested that it become effective
one year from the date of SEC approval.243
By the end of 1997, the SEC published in the Federal Register notice
of the proposed rule change and solicited comments from interested
parties.244
1998: Judge Gertner, U.S. District Judge for the District of
Adhere to Protocol (visited Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.adr.org/empl.html>.
238. See NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,164.
239. See id.
240. See S. 63, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (rendering
void any agreements that employees may make regarding the non-judicial resolution of their
claims, unless employees "voluntarily enter" into an ADR agreement); see also S. 121,
106th Cong. (1999).
241. See Brett D. Fromson, Bidding to End Mandatory Arbitration of Broker Bias,
VASH. PosT, May 11, 1997, at H1.
242. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 3 (stating that the EEOC believes PDAAs
governing employment disputes "are inconsistent with the civil rights laws").
243. See NASD Proposes Eliminating Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims For Registered Brokers, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 7, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter NASD Proposal]; cf. 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164
(1997) (detailing NASD's proposal to the SEC).
244. NASD Proposed Rule Relating to Arbitration, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,164.
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Massachusetts, issued two opinions in the Rosenberg case that negate the
effect of mandatory arbitration clauses in favor of judicial resolution of
245civil rights issues in employment claims.
Duffield is decided, precluding compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims. 6
Seus is decided, upholding compulsory arbitration of Title VII
claims.247
The SEC approves the NASD's proposed rule change, ending
compulsory arbitration of employment discrimination claims.248
The NYSE submits a proposal to the SEC to exclude employment
discrimination claims from arbitration unless the parties agreed to arbitrate
after the claim arose.249
It is telling that a rule, which affected less than two percent of
securities industry plaintiffs, became such a juggernaut, having the dual
effect of coalescing diverse groups and at the same time dividing similar
groups. The present system has consequently exposed fault lines in
industry-sponsored arbitration largely relating to gender and age, and to a
lesser extent issues of forum, who is making the rules, who has to play the
game, and whether employees can opt out of the game, or seek a
meaningful review of the outcome.
We are at a point where the securities industry is dismantling its
arbitration system-precisely because it is a system devised by, and for, the
securities industry status quo. In a previous article, I concluded that
"public perception" was "crucial to confidence in a system," and that to
compel arbitration "as a precondition... unfairly curtails Congressionally
created and judicially recognized rights." s° There has been a backlash, to
borrow from Susan Faludi, against industry-sponsored employment
arbitration.2-1 This handful of cases spoke loudly, and for a variety of
reasons. The origin of these issues is discussed throughout the following
subsections, with emphasis on the issue of the dynamics of power and
control as the main source of the outcome today.
245. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D.
Mass. 1997), affd on other grounds, 163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998); LaChance v. Northeast
Publ'g, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 177 (D. Mass. 1997).
246. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 465 (1998).
247. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
248. Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109, supra note 80.
249. See NYSE Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 52,782.
250. Reder, supra note 12, at 117. See generally Samuel Estreicher, Predispute
Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344 (1997).
251. See generally SusAN FALUDi, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WoMEN (1991); cf. Weimer & Forest, supra note 217.
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B. The Employment Relationship and Civil Rights in the Workplace
Why securities arbitration has provoked a backlash in the employment
context, but not in the financial broker/customer context, is a particularly
compelling question. Both systems, financial and employment, were
crafted by the same industry, yet reactions to them have been disparate.
The employment relationship, as shaped by thirty-five years of civil rights
legislation and litigation, bears attributes that set it apart from the broker-
customer relationship, in which disputes are wholly contractual in nature
and capable of resolution through a straight financial award. Much more, it
seems, is at stake in the resolution of employment disputes. This
subsection discusses employment in the securities industry and delves into
the multiple reasons why employment arbitration has fared so poorly. This
is done first from the point of view of employers and then of employees.
1. Employers
It is instructive at the outset to recognize that in employment-at-
will/noncontractual relationships, courts are generally reluctant to render
void any of the terms or conditions of employment except those that violate
the law or are contrary to public policy. Securities industry employers,
then, have crafted the terms and conditions of employment and have for the
most part been unfettered or burdened by unions or other groups purporting
to represent employees. This one-sided, take-it-or-leave-it model of hiring
and employment is very common in at-will, non-union work. The appeal
of arbitration is hard to resist for employers. Almost every feature, in fact,
favors employers who are also the repeat players in the system, and so, it
seemed, they had nothing to lose. The following quotation is taken from
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., which held that under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, employers may not compel individuals to waive Title
VII rights to a judicial forum.z2 Judge Reinhardt wrote:
Like every individual who wishes to work in the United States as
a broker-dealer in the securities industry, Tonyja Duffield was
required, as a condition of employment mandated by the national
securities exchanges, to waive her right to a judicial forum to
resolve all "employment related" disputes and to agree instead to
arbitrate any such disputes under the exchanges' rules.
Prospective employees must satisfy this condition by signing the
industry's Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer, commonly known as Form U-4.23
252. See 144F.3d 1182.
253. Id. at 1185 (emphasis added).
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Further, the U-4 Form, which requires arbitration, also prospectively
binds employees to amendments of rules or constitutions that may be made
"from time to time." These rules plainly do not inure to the benefit of
employees. Indeed, the arbitration rules among the self-regulatory
organizations bear such similarity that it has been impossible for employees
to avoid the industry's arbitration rules.254 The securities industry is
extremely well-run and cohesive, and it enjoys the services of a powerful
professional group, the Securities Industry Association.255
Presenting to employees the U-4 Form obligating them to resolve
employment disputes through industry-run binding arbitration has been
characterized as a violation of public policy. To the extent plaintiffs are
not informed, are unable to make a knowing and voluntary choice whether
to arbitrate, and do not enjoy rights and remedies coextensive with
statutory ones, the standard enunciated in Mitsubishi and reiterated in
Gilmer has not been met, as the relevant statutory scheme has been
undermined. Courts will not render void an agreement due to mere
inequality of bargaining power. Rather, there must be evidence of fraud,
lack of agreement, or overwhelming economic power. 6  Moreover,
unequal bargaining power does not automatically turn an agreement into a
contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion exists when terms
unreasonably favor the other party, when there is a lack of meaningful
choice, and when the terms are so one-sided as to be unconscionable.2 57 Is
this the case here? The Seus court answered in the negative, but I think that
the answer is not as clear as that court made it seem. Where are the
employees' choices? Who is dictating the terms? Who runs the
arbitration? Could employees have their same job without signing the
254. With minor variations, all SROs and Exchanges require prospective employees to
sign a PDAA. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing NASD and NYSE
arbitration clauses); see infra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing antitrust issues
that arise with this possibly anticompetitive practice). See generally Lisa B. Bingham, On
Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223 (1998).
255. See Letter from Stuart J. Caswell, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Securities Industry Association, to Dennis Vacco, Attorney General, State of New York 1
(Jan. 21, 1998) (stating that the "SIA represents the shared interests of its more than 800
member firms... includjing] investment banks, broker-dealers, specialists and mutual fund
companies. Its members account for approximately 90 percent of the securities business
conducted in North America.").
256. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). See generally Murray S. Levin, The
Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM.
Bus. L.J. 105 (1997).
257. See Seus v. John Nuveen and Co., 146 F.3d 174, 184 (3d Cir. 1998). See generally
Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78
B.U. L. REv. 255 (1998).
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agreement? Does it get any more unequal than this?
Antitrust issues are raised by employer actions, too. Whether the vast
majority of firms agreed to adopt the language such as in the present U-4
Form, either independently or as a group, remains an open question.
Antitrust laws condemn the imposition among competitors of fixed terms
which are generally unrelated to competence and qualifications. 5' Finally,
many wonder whether the SROs even have the power to declare that civil
rights legislation may be bypassed in favor of their private industry-run
system.2' 9 Legislators expressed this view to SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, to
which he replied that "the scope of SRO authority has no clear answer.
Sound arguments can be found on both sides of the issue.'260 A noted
scholar wrote that Chairman Levitt's answer that there is "no clear answer"
seems accurate; realistically, though, plaintiffs today "face an uphill battle"
when advancing this argument.26
2. Employees
It is important to identify the plaintiffs in these securities industry
employment arbitration cases by more than a last name for readers to
understand who has been most impacted by the security industry's
singularly uniform rules. One of the most intriguing aspects of these cases
is that relative to the securities industry as a whole, an unusually high
number of the cases are brought by women and members of other protected
classes of workers. The General Accounting Office noted in its 1994
Report that "the two most frequently cited types of alleged discrimination
were sex and age.
' 262
Indeed, SEC Chair Arthur Levitt noted that "Wall Street serves
America, but it doesn't yet look like America, [and that a] commitment to
policies of inclusion becomes more important as our population grows
258. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37a (1996); see also Washington: Lawyers May Take U-4
Provisions to Justice Department, WALL ST. LErER, July 21, 1997.
259. See Letter from Hon. Edward J. Markey, et al., U.S. Representative, to Arthur
Levitt, Chair, SEC (Feb. 3, 1997) (asserting that Edward J. Markey, Jesse L. Jackson, Jr.,
and Anna G. Esnoo believe the SROs exceeded the authority Congress delegated to them).
260. Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chair, SEC, to Hon. Edward J. Markey et al., U.S.
Representative (Mar. 17, 1997) (replying to Rep. Markey's inquiry). The federal securities
laws provide only an equivocal answer. For example section 15A (g)(3)(B) of the 1934 Act
permits the NASD to require its members to be registered in accordance with procedures it
establishes. Yet, section 15A(b)(6) of the 1934 Act prohibits the NASD from regulating
matters that are not related to the administration of the NASD, or to the Act in general. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 780(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(8) (1996); 780-3(a)-(b); 785(b)-(c) (1998); 785(g)(I); cf.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (1993).
261. John C. Coffee, Jr., Sex and the Securities Industry, N.Y. L.J., May 29, 1997, at 5
(1997).
262. GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.
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more diverse. '263 It has been reported that more than 500,000 Wall Street
workers are covered by arbitration clauses and of this number,
approximately eleven are women.2 4 Yet more than half the plaintiffs in the
aforementioned cases are women. Women are underrepresented in the
securities industry workforce and unfortunately, overrepresented as
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. In a recent settlement
involving allegations of firm-wide discriminatory practices, a complaint
alleges that fewer than five percent of Smith Barney's approximately
11,000 brokers are female.265 At the ten top-grossing securities firms, only
five of the top fifty-eight executives are female.266 This situation exists
despite decades of civil rights in employment legislation, record
educational achievements by women, and employer antidiscrimination
policies printed in employee handbooks. Clearly, something is awry.
The recent numbers of complainants, too, is staggering. For example,
a recent Merrill Lynch settlement of a sexual discrimination lawsuit
allowing suits to proceed to court rather than to binding arbitration affects
"a class of between 2,000 and 2,500 women., 267  The Smith Barney
settlement involving similar charges included twenty-five plaintiffs "and an
eye-popping 23,000 potential [female] class members nationwide.
' 26
Before these breakthroughs, a 1995 Wall Street Journal article reported
problems with the binding arbitration system and stated: "So grim are the
prospects for most women who go through the securities-industry
arbitration process that lawyers say they now often advise their clients not
to bother with arbitration at all. Instead they urge women to take modest
settlements and walk away. 2 69
The backlash that Susan Faludi described in 1991 is a continuing
263. Alexandra Marks, Women Rally on Wall Street, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 24,
1998, at3.
264. See id.; see also Tom Lowry, Can Wall Street Police Itself?. Harassment Case
Points up Secrecy, USA TODAY, May 23, 1996, at 5B.
265. See Lynne Eckert Gasey, Smith Barney Settlement Lowers the Boom on the Boom
Boom Room, CI. LAW., Jan. 1998, at 60 (reporting allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint).
266. See Marks, supra note 263. Moreover, there are only two female CEOs at Fortune
500 companies and just 10% of corporate officers are women. See Ginia Bellafante,
Feminism, It's All About ME!, TIME, June 29, 1998, at 54, 58.
267. Peter Truell, Settlement Proposal Is Expected in Women's Suit Against Merrill,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1998, at Dl.
268. Amy Feldman, Women Battling Key Wall St. Barrier Suit Seeks to Scrap Forced
Arbitration, DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Feb. 23, 1998, at 46; Lisa Kassenaar, Attorney: Bias Suit
Could Cost Merrill Lynch $250M or More, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 1999, at Al1 (detailing
terms of settlement with 900 women in the securities industry who brought sex
discrimination claims against their employer); Ann Wozencraft, About 900 Women Will Join
Suit Against Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at C6 (noting an expert's opinion
that the positive response among women employees was unusually high when asked to join
in the class action sex discrimination suit against Merrill Lynch).
269. Margaret A. Jacobs, Men's Club, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al.
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phenomenon most often occurring in traditionally male industries. It
clearly took bravery, conviction, and patience on the part of plaintiffs to
vindicate their rights--especially in industry-sponsored and staffed forums.
What makes the sheer numbers of complaints and lack of equal opportunity
for women, so stunning is that all of this has happened during a period of
seemingly limitless economic growth, perhaps the best the Federal Reserve
Chief has seen in nearly fifty years. °
This diversity gap, most particularly addressed here as a gender gap, is
too broad and diffuse throughout the securities industry to render it mere
coincidence that plaintiffs are mostly women. This is another example of a
traditionally male-dominated industry in which women have struggled, and
continue to struggle, for the opportunities to participate and to be rewarded
in ways that are coextensive with their equally educated and experienced
male counterparts.'71 Of the circuit court securities industry discrimination
cases discussed in Part II, thirteen of the lawsuits involved male plaintiffs.
They are, in no particular order: Theodore Halligan, Ceasar Wright, Andre
Mouton, William Kummetz, Jake Armijo, Ronald Kidd, Arthur Williams,
Robert Battle, Raymond DiRussa, Ronald Spyrnal, Thomas Imhoff, John
Glennon, and Keith Schooley. Their claims are fairly evenly divided
among allegations of discrimination based upon disability, national origin,
270. See Richard W. Stevenson, Fed Chief Calls the Economy One of the Best He Has
Seen, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at Al. On the same day, the NEw YORK TInEs also
published an article which focused on the plight of women who reportedly have borne the
brunt of the economic disaster in Asia. See Nicholas D. Kristof, As Asian Economies
Shrink Women Are Squeezed Out, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at A12. They have been the
first to be fired from their jobs and have fared far worse than their male counterparts. If the
U.S. economy is "as good as it gets," presumably this is true for American women, yet it is
undeniably less good and less true for this subset of the workforce. See generally
Bellafante, supra note 266 (reporting that the average female worker still earns 25% less
than male workers in comparable jobs).
271. See Christine Neylon O'Brien et al., Employer Fetal Protection Policies at Work:
Balancing Reproductive Hazards with Title VII Rights, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 147 (1991)
(discussing how the law has evolved as questions arise over women who have begun to
work in higher-paying, benefit-rich jobs traditionally reserved for men); Ann Wozencraft,
Bias at the Bull, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1999, at B1 (detailing subtle obstacles facing women
in the securities industry such as distribution of the predominant number of leads to
established senior male brokers, and other incidences all of which result in a pattern of
economic disparity). See generally Steven A. Holmes, Women Surpass Men in Educational
Achievement, Census Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at A18 (reporting that there is
now a "cohort of women that is better educated than its male counterparts"); Patricia M.
Flynn et al., The Evolving Gender Mix in Accounting: Implications for the Future of the
Profession, 13 GRADUATE MGMT. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL SELECTIONs 28-39 (1996)
(discussing the shift in the gender mix and its associated challenges for an evolving
workforce that is increasingly more diversified and specialized); Elliott S. Levy et al.,
Customized Work Arrangements in the Accounting Profession: An Uncertain Future,
Report to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, May 1998 (detailing the structural and social
impediments to women's full participation in partnerships at public accounting firms).
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race and age. None of their claims were based on sex discrimination.
Twenty-one of these securities industry discrimination cases were
brought by female plaintiffs. Of course, it is appropriate to use caution
when discussing anecdotal reports. But these numbers, and these plaintiffs,
speak volumes about the system as it has been operating. The figures are
remarkable not only because the proportion of female plaintiffs in decided
cases is wildly disproportionate to their percentage of participation in the
field, but also because the women's suits went forward in spite of the
overwhelming pressure to leave their jobs, settle their claims, and move on.
The women are: Susan Rosenberg, Sheila Wamock Seus, Camille Rojas,
Erlinda Hourigan, Kristine Utley, Claudia Cosgrove, Jana Kresock, Linda
Willis, Joan Chasen Alford, Tonyja Duffield, Sharon Lockhart, Rachel
Renteria, Marybeth Cremin, Justine Lai, Darlene Nieminski, Rosalind
Beauchamp, Dano Mago, Linda Bender, Kelli Lyn Metz, and Kay
Kuehner. The vast majority of their claims, in contrast to those of the male
plaintiffs, were based on sex discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and
sexual harassment. One of these claims alleged discrimination on the basis
of race or national origin, and just a handful involved claims of age or
disability discrimination. Clearly, men and women, even while working
side-by-side in the same industry, are having wholly different experiences.
The employment relationships in the securities industry must be
improved to create an environment where all employees are valued,
mentored, and rewarded in a way that relies on merit and value added to the
firm. To hire women or other minorities yet fail to integrate them fully in
every aspect of the firm's official and unofficial culture, both within the
firm and outside at general industry functions, has the effect of promoting
their failure.
The unfortunate aspect of all the recent attention focused on securities
industry ADR is that it is concentrated only on improving the way the
disputes are being processed. While this is, of course, deserving of
attention, and is the subject of the following sections, the matters raised in
this section are of urgent concern, for there would be no disputes to resolve
if the employees had not been discriminated against in the first place. The
issue of advancing full participation regardless of age, disability, gender,
race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religion in this workforce, which has
been historically white and male, is critical to the overall strength of our
economy and social fabric of this country.
C. The Securities Industry Employment Arbitration Process As an
Example of Employers Reaching for Too Much, and Going Too Far
The concept of industry-created, industry-run mandatory binding
arbitration is so questionable, in terms of procedural or substantive fairness,
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that it would be miraculous if it were neutral and well-received by every
stakeholder in the process. It is probably a surprise to no one that there was
no miracle, and in time there will be a more balanced approach for
resolving disputes. Why the securities industry designed a system
practically destined for failure is uncertain and speculative at best. It is
perhaps irresistible to have nearly free rein to make rules for a dispute
resolution system. Because plaintiffs typically avail themselves of the
system just once, while defendants repeatedly handle these matters in a
relatively private way, it has taken some time to grasp fully the effect of the
industry-devised and industry-run system.
While there are a myriad of complex, interrelated issues, this Article
focuses on the main points of contention, which are those addressed by the
Arbitration Policy Task Force, a diverse group representative of the various
constituencies involved.272 The question of whether the industry rules are
substantively or procedurally fair to all stakeholders is common to each of
the points in discussion. It is helpful, then, to disclose the Task Force's
recommendations in summary form, below.
1. The securities industry should be permitted to continue to include
predispute arbitration agreements in customer contracts, but disclosure
should be improved.
2. The NASD six-year eligibility rule should be suspended for three
years during which time recommended procedures for early resolution of
statute of limitations issues should be firmly applied.
3. Parties should be prohibited from bringing actions in court raising
procedural arbitrability issues before an arbitration award has been entered.
4. Punitive damages should be permitted in all jurisdictions
(determined by the investor's domicile) where available in a judicial forum
for the same types of claims, subject to a cap of the lesser of two times
compensatory damages or $750,000.
5. The NASD should expand its voluntary mediation program and
institute a two-year pilot program in early neutral evaluation.
6. The NASD should continue to offer an arbitration system with three
tiers: simplified, standard, and complex, and the ceiling for the simplified
procedures should be raised from $10,000 to $30,000.
7. Automatic production of essential documents should be required for
all parties, and arbitrators should play a much greater role in directing
discovery and resolving discovery disputes.
272. There are a number of law review articles that address this question, too. See, e.g.,
Hoffman, supra note 9; Lewton, supra note 14; Filiault, supra note 20; Ponte, supra note
51; Howard, supra note 68; see also Michael Delikat, Binding Arbitration of Employment
Claims: The Shifting Landscape, 22 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 25 (1997); Michele L. Giovagnoli,
Note, To Be or Not To Be?: Recent Resistance to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the
Employment Arena, 64 U. Mo., KAN. CITY L. REv. 547 (1996).
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8. Arbitrator selection, quality, training, and performance should be
improved by various means, including adoption of a list selection method,
earlier appointment of arbitrators, enhancement of arbitrator training, and
increased compensation.
9. Employment disputes, including statutory discrimination claims,
should continue to be subject to arbitration, but with the enhancements
recommended for customer disputes.
10. NASD pilot rules for injunctions in member-member disputes are
beneficial and should be closely monitored.
11. Non-lawyers should be allowed to continue representing parties in
arbitration, subject to certification; the NASD should conduct a study to
examine whether to continue to permit non-lawyer representation.
12. The staffing and budget of the NASD Arbitration and Mediation
Department should be increased.
13. The NASD should provide budgetary and operational autonomy
for the arbitration system, which should be administered either as a unit of
the newly created NASD regulation subsidiary or as a separate unit
reporting directly to the NASD parent holding company.
14. Procedures for monitoring the implementation of the
recommendations of this Report should be established by the NASD.273
The Task Force clearly found room for improvement, both in the
arbitration process, and in arbitrator quality/training. Most notably, this
diverse group recommended that the industry maintain its mandatory
binding pre-dispute arbitration system, in spite of the questions it has
raised. 27 4
Beyond these important areas of concern, there are a few salient points
deserving mention, most of which are related to the Task Force
recommendations. There is, first of all, much criticism of securities
industry arbitrators having the responsibility of issuing decisions in
statutory employment law disputes. Lack of arbitrator quality and
competency are among the most frequent complaints of plaintiffs. Most
often, arbitrators are current and retired members of the securities industry
who have years of experience. This experience, almost without exception,
is in securities sales, trading, mergers and acquisitions, futures,
commodities, etc. Arbitrators generally do not have much experience
handling securities industry employment issues. Their competency to
consider and decide claims of such critical importance-claims that reach
beyond compensation, affecting careers and livelihoods-is very suspect.
Their professional background, no matter how impressive, is not an
adequate preparation for deciding employment disputes.
273. See NASD TASK FORCE, supra note 82, at 1-3.
274. It is ironic, perhaps, that these Task Force recommendations will never be
implemented due to the suspension of the mandatory employment arbitration system.
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A GAO Report found that these same arbitrators are, not surprisingly,
mostly white males averaging sixty years of age.275 This issue did not
receive sufficient coverage in the Task Force report but is highly relevant
nonetheless. This is a central problem in the securities industry and in its
arbitration program-a disproportionate percentage of the plaintiffs are
women who have not been able to continue their careers in this industry.
They are made to resolve claims before arbitrators who presumably have
flourished and succeeded in the system that these women and others are
276now challenging. It is unworkable.
As the arbitrators are chosen for their securities expertise and are not
subject to mandatory continuing professional training, they are not
necessarily as representative of society as a jury would be. Moreover, the
size of arbitrator panels, limited to a few members, cannot match the
possibilities for diversity of a jury. Additionally, compensation for
arbitrators is recognized as a problem. NASD arbitrators receive an
honorarium of $225 per day, as of the time the Task Force Report was
published.277 This below-market rate limits the numbers of people willing
to participate and compromises the quality of members, which "is not as
high as it could be."27s This generally has gone unnoticed because, unlike
judges, arbitrators deciding employment disputes are not publicly chosen or
accountable. The decisions are becoming more widely available but
disclosure of decisions and decision makers nowhere near approaches the
visibility of a litigated or settled case. This relative secrecy has perhaps
slowed the development of law in this area and led to missed opportunities
for the advancement of novel legal theories and approaches. By way of
example, two intriguing theories that are relatively promising for plaintiffs
have only just begun to be discussed seriously as cases have begun to be
heard in court-first, whether the SEC even has the power to make a
mandatory binding arbitration rule depriving plaintiffs of the choice to
bring suit for resolution of statutory claims, and second, whether the SROs
concerted action of adopting identical rules violates antitrust laws. These
challenges go to the core of the system yet were not addressed by it.
The NASD, however, has responded to the Task Force Report. In
October 1998, the NASD filed with the SEC a proposed rule change
designed to improve the arbitrator selection method. 279 Additionally, the
NASD reports that it is developing a specialized roster of arbitrators to
275. See GAO EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
276. See id.
277. See NASD Task Force, supra note 82, at 103-04. Of course, the concept of
payment is inimical to the Article III judicial system. These types of costs are problematic
in terms of the appearance of justice and neutrality, and contribute to the perception of bias.
278. Id. at 109.
279. See 63 Fed. Reg. 56,957 (1998).
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decide employment cases. The NASD further reports that these arbitrators
will not be those who in their private capacities primarily represent
employers or employees and attempt to coordinate judicial and arbitral
280claims in order to minimize bifurcation. These proposals are most
certainly well-intended and considered. It remains to be seen, though,
whether they will be used now that judicial forums are once again an
option.
Beyond arbitrator issues, there are arbitration issues-procedural and
substantive challenges to the system itself. These too were addressed by
the Task Force, but a few points bear mention here. The first set of issues
arises out of the initial signing of the U-4 form by employees. Given the
almost complete absence of bargaining power on the part of employees,
i.e., please sign this if you wish to have a job; it is surprising that this has
been, until recently, a relatively unsuccessful legal theory.
281
A historically more effective argument has been that the employees
did not knowingly waive their rights to a judicial forum, thus negating the
validity of the arbitration clause. For how could employees soundly
evaluate the relative merits of the judicial and arbitral systems if they are
not fully explained? Based on this claim alone, it is probable that every U-
4 form was not signed "knowingly." The Ninth Circuit first recognized this
claim in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai.
282
The second set of arbitration issues, arises out of the post-dispute
resolution process and relates mainly to procedures and remedies. The
following challenges arise most often: time for filing claims, discovery,
arbitrator challenges, arbitrator pay, remedies such as back pay,
compensatory damages, front pay, reinstatement, interest, punitives,
attorney's fees, judicial review, and public disclosure. To the extent that
the procedural rules and available remedies are not coextensive with those
found in a judicial forum, the system is bound to fail. For example, to cap
punitive damages at a level below what plaintiffs could seek in court
infringes on congressionally-created rights. As another example, the
system for challenges is tightly controlled by the securities industry. Even
with one peremptory challenge, and unlimited challenges for cause, there
still exists a "fundamental imbalance" in a panel appointed by the SROs. s3
Judicial review of arbitration decisions is limited as well, and arbitrators
280. See NASD Proposes Enhancements to Arbitration of Securities Industry
Employment Discrimination Claims, PR NEwswiRE, Oct. 8, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, US File.
281. See generally Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing how forcing employees to opt for one of two "choices," sign Form U-4 or seek
another profession, is "fundamentally at odds with civil rights legislation").
282. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995).
283. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190, 200
(D. Mass. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998).
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are not bound to follow relevant civil rights laws. The procedures and
remedies are, at this point in the rules that have been
drafted and proposed to the SEC by the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration (SICA), a group composed primarily
of members of the SROs and their trade association, the
Securities Industry Association. The form 'public members'
from outside the securities industry are outnumbered more than
two-to-one. Outside 'regularly invited guests' include the SEC
and the American Arbitration Association, but they cannot
vote.284
No matter how debatable one may find the assertions of gender, claim,
and age bias in the system, it is incontrovertible that "structural bias" exists
within this system "dominated by the securities industry, that is by the
employment side, of this dispute."2 5 This forum is quite simply inadequate
to vindicate employees' rights. The unique nature of these securities
industry employment disputes which sets them apart from broker-customer
financial disputes is the unique public function that exists in civil rights
litigation. Whereas the arbitral process is relatively confidential and
outside of the public forum, employment litigation is public and is
continually developing, testing, and redefining the contours of the law.
Moreover, to the extent that the results are undesirable, Congress may
amend the law, thus providing for a balance of opinion created by a wide
consensus, greater than could ever be achieved through private compulsory,
industry-sponsored arbitration.8 6
Public statutory law confers (1) substantive rights and (2) a reasonable
right of access to a neutral forum. Civil rights laws exhibit a strong public
interest in enforcement and deterrence that do not exist to the same degree
in broker-customer financial disputes. This system, which coerces
employees to give up rights many do not even yet know they possess,
sponsors the forum, creates its own rules, staffs it by industry insiders, and
finally takes away the possibility of meaningful judicial review, does not
nearly meet the minimum standards to maintain the necessary level of
neutrality, competence and trust in the system. This inadequacy has come
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. This has been the case with recent relevant civil rights legislation. When the Civil
Rights Procedures Protection Act was first introduced in 1996, there were only 10 co-
sponsors, and just one year later there were 35 co-sponsors. See infra notes 305-306 and
accompanying text (discussing the Congressional bills); see also Susan Antilla, Wall Street
Women's Sex Harassment Suits, A Year Later, PLAIN DEALER, May 26, 1997, at 3D,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. Making suits, class actions, settlements,
and decisions public has had the effect of making employers and employees more aware of
both their rights and responsibilities, which cannot happen with a relatively confidential
arbitration system.
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under scrutiny of the EEOC and other agencies. Of course, changes are to
be made within the year.
D. Current Legislative and Agency Initiatives: What Their Effect Will Be
If and When They Are Passed
1. The EEOC
On July 10, 1997, the EEOC Chair Gilbert F. Casellas issued the
EEOC's most strongly worded Policy Statement opposing mandatory
binding arbitration of employment disputes. It characterized PDAAs as
"contrary to the fundamental principles evinced in [U.S. employment
discrimination] laws. 287 It should be conceded that part of the EEOC's
animosity towards arbitration may be attributed to the fact that the EEOC's
regulatory authority over employment cases from this sector is
compromised by the industry's use of compulsory arbitration. But beyond
any real or imagined turf war, the EEOC presented in its Policy Statement a
number of persuasive assertions about why it opposes this system of
arbitration.
This document was issued on the heels of two other relevant EEOC
documents. In April 1997, the EEOC issued Enforcement Guidance to all
of its offices setting forth its position that "an employer may not interfere
with the protected right of employees to file a charge.., under [any] of the
laws enforced by the EEOC. '288 Furthermore, between these dates an
EEOC Task Force reported to the Chair its development of a National
Enforcement Plan to identify priority issues and formulate a plan for their
enforcement.289 One of the first efforts to be made, according to the Task
Force, is to "encourage the voluntary resolution of disputes where
appropriate and feasible," and only when voluntary efforts fail, is litigation
recommended.2 0 Recognizing that its "effectiveness as a law enforcement
agency had been reduced by the overwhelming increase in its inventory of
individual charges of discrimination, [and] by the lack of [commensurate]
financial resources," the EEOC is attempting to balance the problems of
arbitration with its advantages.291
In an effort to reconcile arbitration and litigation, maximizing the
positive features of each, the EEOC took the position that arbitration is
287. EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
288. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 3, at 2.
289. See EEOC, National Enforcement Plan (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/nep.html>.
290. Id. at 2. (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 1.
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absolutely an appropriate forum in which to vindicate civil rights in
employment claims, provided certain conditions are met. The agreement
must be voluntary rather than unilateral. The agreement must not be a
condition of employment. Arbitration may not be exempt from the federal
enforcement of civil rights laws. (This had not been required by the SEC.)
Employees must always be able to choose to vindicate their rights in court.
The agreement should only be made at the time the dispute arises-known
1,2as a post-dispute agreement.2 Notably, the EEOC endorses binding
arbitration and does not mention judicial review of arbitrators' decisions,
which under the current system is insufficient. On balance, the EEOC got
it right when it stated that arbitration should be a voluntary, unconditional,
mutual choice not made until the dispute arises.
2. The SEC
Just three weeks after release of the EEOC Policy Statement, the
NASD proposed to eliminate compulsory arbitration of statutory
discrimination claims.293 Following the requisite notice and comment
period, the proposal was considered by the SEC, which has final authority
over all rules. The SEC approved the proposal in June 1998, and it
becomes effective on January 1, 1999.294 It applies to those claims brought
on or after that date.
The rule change modifies language currently found in the NASD's
Form U-4. Paragraph (a) adds a prefatory phrase indicating that the
requirement to arbitrate contains an exception, as found in Paragraph (b).
Paragraph (b) states: "[A]ssociated persons are no longer required.., to
arbitrate claims of statutory employment discrimination. Associated
persons will still be required to arbitrate other employment-related
claims.
,295
The SEC approval of the NASD's proposal was concise and pointed.
Notably, the SEC declined to discuss two other points in the proposal.
First, the NASD had mentioned plans to improve disclosure to employees
of the effect of their signing the Form U-4, in ways such as highlighting
their rights and the features of arbitration.296 These plans would greatly
enhance disclosure and informed consent on the part of employees.
Second, the NASD planned to improve and expand disclosure on the Form
292. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 3.
293. See NASD Proposal, supra note 243.
294. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109, supra note 80.
295. 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,165 (1997); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109,
supra note 80.
296. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,167.
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U-4 itself.297 It seems the NASD is unbowed by recent changes: regarding
this last proposal, the NASD stated that it "intends to work with other
regulators. 298 It could be that the securities industry may consult with the
EEOC, but even so, employee groups are noticeably absent as possible
consultants. The NASD has left open the possibility that individual firms
could include mandatory provisions in employment agreements.
Finally, the SEC expressly declined to consider other rules concerning
employment agreements or to extend the new rule to other causes of action,
reasoning that the NASD must consider them in the first instance." Even
facing the prospect of bifurcated proceedings,3°° the SEC and SROs remain
committed to arbitration of employment disputes as a quicker, less
expensive, and more private alternative than litigation.
Another problem, which has received virtually no attention, is the
effect the NASD rule change has on other SROs. While it is unclear what
other SROs have decided, the NYSE has proposed amending its rules to
exclude claims of employment discrimination from arbitration, unless the
parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it has arisen.0 ' This
represents an amendment of NYSE Rule 347, and of Rule 600 with a new
sub-section (f) providing for post-dispute arbitration.30 2 Anticipating the
bifurcation issue, amended Rule 347 provides for the entire case to be
heard in court in certain circumstances. °3 Should other SROs not modify
their rules, there would be a lack of uniformity leading to undesirable
results. This issue should be immediately under consideration by the SEC,
as this situation already occurred in 1998 in the Imhoffcase.3 4
3. Legislation and Other Recommendations
Beyond the two regulatory agencies with jurisdiction, there is a
297. See id.
298. Id.; see generally Fromson, supra note 241. In another instance, when amending
rules for its simplified arbitration procedure, NASD Regulation consulted just two sources,
and both industry groups: the NYSE and the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration.
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, SEC Release No. 34-38466, File No. SR-NASD-97-22
(Apr. 2, 1997).
299. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-40109, supra note 80.
300. Cf. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (acknowledging
appropriateness of bifurcating federal statutory, and pendant state law claims); Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (discrimination claims allowed to proceed in
court, while other claim heard in arbitration).
301. See 63 Fed. Reg. 52,782 (1998).
302. See id. at 52,782-52,783; see also Dominic Bencivenga, Mandatory Arbitration:
Are Programs Dead or Just in Need of Repair?, N.Y. L.J. 5 (1998).
303. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 52,783-52,784.
304. See Imhoff v. Charles Schwab & Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1178 (D. Ariz. Jan.
14, 1998).
ARBITRATING SECURITIES INDUSTRY
legislative effort to modify and clarify existing law in this area. Senate Bill
63, the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act, proposes to amend all civil
rights in employment statutes. The amendment provides that: "plaintiffs
may bring suit in federal court and such powers and procedures shall be the
exclusive powers and procedures applicable to such claims unless after
such claim arises the claimant voluntarily enters into an agreement to
resolve such claim through arbitration or another procedure.
305
The Bill also proposes to amend the Federal Arbitration Act to clarify
that it does not apply "with respect to a claim of unlawful discrimination in
employment if such claim arises from discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability. 30 6  Clearly, there is a
premium placed on the timing of the making of the arbitration agreement.
Every party to have considered this question has supported the proposition
that employees should not be required to choose arbitration until after the
dispute arises. Also, legislators have emphasized that the process of
entering into the agreement must be voluntary. It is interesting that there is
no mention of a requirement that this be a knowing and voluntary
agreement. It is arguable that an agreement that is entered into voluntarily
is also made knowingly, but such is not always the case.307 Compulsory is
not voluntary, and the system must evolve into a consensual one.
Finally, there have been recommendations from organizations that
have an interest but no direct stake in this issue. The Dunlop Commission
recommends that employees be given a choice whether to litigate or
arbitrate.08 This choice should be made after the dispute has arisen. °9
This Commission makes two additional noteworthy points. It recommends
that arbitral systems adopt a standard of judicial review similar to the
review of a lower court decision. The Dunlop Commission also raises a
novel approach to employment arbitration which involves employees in the
process. It states: "In the long run the best way to ensure the acceptability
to workers of binding arbitration of their public law claims is to afford
employees an independent voice in the design and implementation of such
programs. 310
This simple, inexpensive, and brilliant strategy is precisely what the
securities industry was lacking when it developed its industry-sponsored
system, and is the thesis of Part III.C above. The Dunlop Commission also
devoted a portion of its report to due process concerns, another vulnerable
305. S. 63; H.R. 983, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); see also S. 121, 106th Cong. (1999).
306. Id. at § 9.
307. See id. See generally Media Alert, American Arbitration Association Encourages
Use of Voluntary Arbitration to Resolve Employment Disputes, July 9, 1997 (discussing that
process is most effective when parties "knowingly and voluntarily agree on the process").
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feature of industry-sponsored arbitration. It repeatedly called for "fair"
policies and methods regarding discovery, access, cost-sharing,
representation, remedies, opinions, and judicial review.3 1 The American
Arbitration Association issued National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes recognizing that the process must be fair and
equitable for all parties. 12 The rules approach the level of due process
afforded litigants in court. For example, arbitrators have the power to order
discovery, they must be experienced in the field, and they may grant any
remedy deemed just and equitable including those available had the matter
been heard in court.313
The initiatives detailed in this section are critical for the legitimacy
and success of any dispute resolution system-judicial or arbitral. Had the
securities industry not reached so far and instead shared some power and
control, the system's fall might not have been so extreme. Each
organization, the agencies, legislators, and interest groups have made
worthy suggestions for the betterment of employment arbitration. The
recommendations they have made, along with those found in the
Arbitration Policy Task Force Report, will promote a fair and equitable
system. Issues of money and control propelled the securities industry to
create a flawed system, parts of which may still be salvaged.
IV. CONCLUSION
Employment arbitration must evolve from a compulsory system to a
knowing, consensual one. This consent must not be a condition of
employment, but rather be unconditional and made later in the employment
relationship when the dispute arises. Employee rights should not be
susceptible to prospective waiver. Procedures as well as remedies must be
coextensive with those granted by statute, otherwise employees' civil rights
will be eviscerated. Although this may cause proceedings to be bifurcated,
this complication is outweighed by the value of fairness and equity in the
system.
The legacy of the securities industry arbitration system as it existed
prior to 1998 rests on two general themes-control, and to a lesser extent,
gender. Had the securities industry sought out and included views from
employees and such interested parties in an effort to build a consensus, the
311. See id. at 8-12.
312. See American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http:/www.adr.org/rules/
employment.rules.html> [hereinafter National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes]; see also A Due Process Protocol, supra note 235; Estreicher, supra note 250, at
1374-75.
313. See National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, supra note 312.
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system would more likely than not have been perceived and realized as a
just, fair, and neutral system. The level of power the securities industry
asserted and control that it maintained simply is not tenable. This issue
will also have the legacy of exposing the continued problems in integrating
industries historically closed to others. Women in particular are the ones in
the securities industry who have lost their jobs, careers, and income, and
who wait for a chance to seek justice. The disproportionate effect on
women, older workers, and racial and ethnic minorities is a legacy the
securities industry must overcome to ensure that all employees are able to
maximize their participation and ultimately their success and advancement.
The reader should not conclude from this Article that arbitration is
"bad" or "second-class justice." It is simply that arbitration is variable in
that each agreement is different. Each agreement, no matter the industry,
should preserve parties' rights, offer a neutral forum, and allow for
meaningful judicial review. Arbitration has developed over the years and
has great potential to serve justice in an inexpensive and speedy fashion
that could never be matched by litigation. Perhaps arbitration should not be
as considered 'alternative' anymore, but rather as a starting point for the
resolution of parties' disputes.
To start with the process of arbitration, knowing that there is available
(if needed), meaningful review of the arbitral decision, is a much less
threatening strategy. On balance, arbitration will be most successful when
it is a forum agreed upon by both parties in a knowing and voluntary way
and when the agreement is the product of all stakeholders, not when it is a
condition of employment, entered into after the dispute arises. The
arbitration forum should be neutral and follow rules agreed upon in
advance. Procedures and remedies should be coextensive with those found
in the statute. The arbitrator agreed upon should be a well-trained neutral.
The process should even be non-binding. Judicial review should be similar
to that found between reviewing and trial courts. These are the hallmarks
of a successful program in which the agreement and process is the result of
each parties' efforts and assent.
There is room for both arbitration and litigation, and had arbitration
procedures been well-thought out in the first instance, this wholesale retreat
might have been avoided. There is no inherent conflict between arbitration
and the vindication of statutory employment discrimination claims; it is
incumbent, though, to provide all parties with a system that is perceived as
fair, accessible, and voluntary, and that such perception is made a reality.
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